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THE MALFORMED MOUSE MEETS
THE LIBR*:
SECURED AND RESTITUTIONARY
CLAIMS TO COMMINGLED FUNDS
HAROLD R. WEINBERG**
Wee, sleeket, cowran, tim'rous beastie
0, what a panic's in thy breastie!
Thou need na start awa sae hasty,
Wi' bickering brattle!
I wad be laith to rin an' chase thee,
Wi' murd'ring pattle!t
They mix about as easy as ile and water.tt
I. INTRODUCTION
The "malformed mouse" is section 9-306(4)(d) of the Uniform
Commercial Code. 1 It provides a formula that determines the extent to
Copyright © 1989, Harold R. Weinberg
"LIBR" is an acronym for the extra-Code tracing methodology known as
the lowest intermediate balance rule.
*'Alumni Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law. I would like to
thank John Hetherington, Saul Levmore, John McCoid, Emily Sherwin, and the
participants at the University of Virginia Faculty Workshop for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this article. Excellent research assistance was
provided by Timothy J. Conner, Class of 1988, University of Kentucky College
of Law.
tR. BURNS, To a Mouse On Turning Her Up in Her Nest, with the Plough,
November, 1785, st.1 (1785), in POEMS AND SONGS 101 (J. Kinsley ed. 1969).
"T. C. HALIBURTON, SAM: SAM SLICK'S WISE SAWS AND MODERN
INSTANCES; OR WHAT HE SAID, DID, OR INVENTED 249 (n.p. 1853).
1A.L.I. & NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1978 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS
[hereinafter U.C.C. or the Code] § 9-306(4)(d) (1977). Professor Robert H.
Skilton probably coined the term "malformed mouse." See Skilton, The Secured
Party's Rights in a Debtor's Bank Account Under Section 9-306(4)(d) of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 1978 S. ILL. L.J. 60, 97.
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which an insolvent debtor's commingled bank account contains funds
subject to a security interest. A special entitlement is necessary because it
is impossible to physically distinguish this collateral after commingling.
The label malformed mouse is appropriate if one agrees with critics who
have questioned the mouse's statutory architecture and underlying
rationale. 2 The image of an elusive creature is also apt. The mouse
continues to elude understanding, although it has been part of the Code
for many years and the subject of uniform clarifying amendments. 3 The
"brattle" or clatter caused by section 9-306(4)(d) is disproportionate to
the mouse's stature. In the breast of the malformed mouse is its drafters'
concern that secured creditors recover at least some commingled funds in
bankruptcy. 4 The creature's ability to withstand the avoiding powers of
bankruptcy trustees is a leitmotiv in this commentary.5 The malformed
mouse's entitlement assumes that most of the funds in a bankrupt debtor's
bank account are proceeds from the liquidation of original collateral.
6
The lowest intermediate balance rule 7 ("LIBR") and related
restitutionary doctrine provide a second means for determining a secured
creditor's entitlement to commingled funds. The LIBR assumes that
collateral deposited in a commingled account is immiscible with and floats
upon the other funds in the account. Oil floating upon water is an
appropriate analogy.
Although there is authority to the contrary, the generally accepted
view is that Article Nine provides an asymmetric constellation of
entitlements to commingled funds. 8 Extra-Code tracing principles,
including the LIBR, may be employed to reach funds of the debtor when
the debtor is not in insolvency proceedings. In these proceedings extra-
2See, e.g., Oesterle, Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to Trace Misappropriated
Property in Equity and in UCC § 9-306, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 172, 184 (1983);
Skilton, supra note 1, at 96-97.
3 See Dunne, Editor's Headnotes: Commingled Proceeds-Clarification, Please!, 104
BANKING L.J. 3 (1987). The mouse's drafting history is discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 91-112.
4See generally 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY 1338 (1965).
5See, e.g., Skilton, supra note 1, at 80-91.
62 G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 1340. See Oesterle, supra note 2, at 214.
7See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 212 (1937).
8 See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1011-13 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter WHITE &
SUMMERS]. But see R. HENSON, HANDBOOK OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 16-31 (2d ed. 1979).
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Code tracing is preempted by section 9-306(4)(d).
9 There is uncertainty
concerning the entitlement to commingled funds transferred by the
debtor to a third party prior to bankruptcy.
This article analyzes the recovery of funds subject to a security
interest in or out of bankruptcy. Part II considers the mechanics of section
9-306(4)(d) and restitutionary tracing rules, including the LIBR. Part III
examines the roles envisioned for these entitlements by the Code drafters.
It also considers remedial and priority issues in secured claims to
commingled cash proceeds and offers a general perspective on the
relationship between restitutionary theory and Article Nine. Part IV
explores the wisdom of the drafters' entitlement scheme. It initially
considers the reasons for providing any entitlement to commingled cash
proceeds. It then isolates sources of credit cost that may be reduced by an
entitlement, and incorporates them into an analysis of whether the
malformed mouse or restitutionary tracing theory more closely
approaches optimality. The article's conclusion weighs the merits of
altering the Code's current asymmetric constellation of entitlements.
II. ANATOMY OF TWO ENTITLEMENTS
A. The Malformed Mouse
Section 9-306(4)(d) provides a formula for the recovery of proceeds in
insolvency proceedings:
In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a debtor, a
secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds has a
perfected security interest only in the following proceeds:
(d) in all cash and deposit accounts of the debtor in which proceeds
have been commingled with other funds, but the perfected security
interest under this paragraph . . . is ... limited to an amount not
greater than the amount of any cash proceeds received by the debtor
within ten days before the institution of the insolvency
proceedings .... 10
A secured party's recovery under the mouse's ten day formula is subject to
set-off by the institution maintaining the deposit account containing the
9See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 1014-15.
10U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d) (1977).
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commingled funds, n and must be reduced by certain other proceeds to
which the secured party is entitled aside from the mouse. 12 These limits
have been the subject of litigation and critical commentary. 13 For the
purpose of this article, the language of the ten day formula is the most
significant aspect of section 9-306(4)(d). The mouse has three littermates
that also apply in insolvency proceedings, which permit the secured party
to identify uncommingled cash proceeds. 14 They are of interest only to
the extent that they define cases to which the mouse is inapplicable
because of a lack of commingling.
Understanding section 9-306(4)(d) requires a working familiarity
with several key terms. The mouse is intended to apply only in the event
of "insolvency proceedings." 15 Federal bankruptcy is so clearly
preeminent in this field that it will be treated as synonymous with
"insolvency proceedings."' 6 Recovery pursuant to section 9-306(4)(d) is
possible only if a security interest is "perfected." Unless otherwise
indicated, this article assumes satisfaction of this requirement by an
appropriate filing. 1
7
"See id. § 9-306(4)(d)(i).
12See id. § 9-306(4)(d)(ii).
"3See generally Skilton, supra note 1, at 70-74, 79-80 (providing analysis of
litigation concerning extent to which secured parties may recover commingled
funds under U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)).
"4See U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(a)-(c), which provides for the recovery of: (a)
identifiable noncash proceeds; (b) separate deposit accounts containing only
proceeds; (c) identifiable cash proceeds in the form of money that is neither
commingled with other money nor deposited in a deposit account prior to the
insolvency proceedings; and (d) identifiable cash proceeds in the form of checks
and the like that are not deposited in a deposit account prior to the insolvency
proceedings.
"See U.C.C. § 1-201(22) (defining "insolvency proceedings" as
proceedings intended to liquidate or rehabilitate the estate of a debtor).
6See, e.g., In re Barkley, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1378, 1380
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1983) (holding that a liquidation under 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-
66 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) is an insolvency proceeding as that term is used in
U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)); In re Cooper, 2 Bankr. 188, 195 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980)
(similar holding with respect to a reorganization under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
17A security interest in cash proceeds such as checks, deposit accounts, or
money may be perfected by properly filing against the original collateral. U.C.C.
§§ 9-303(1), 9-306(3)(b). It also may be perfected automatically for ten days. Id.
§ 9-306(3)(c). See also In re Armstrong, 56 Bankr. 781, 787 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1986). These rules are exceptions. Article Nine generally requires the secured
party to take possession of checks and money in order to perfect its interest. See
U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1), 9-304(1), 9-305.
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A secured party's most likely target under section 9-306(4)(d) is a
"deposit account" of the debtor in which proceeds have been commingled
with other funds. 18 The size of the secured party's recovery from a deposit
account is determined by the amount of "cash proceeds" received by the
debtor within ten days before bankruptcy.19 For example, a debtor may
sell inventory collateral and receive payment in cash or by check within
the ten day period. Some of these proceeds are then deposited in the
debtor's general business checking account. The money or check is cash
proceeds. 20 The checking account, also cash proceeds, is a deposit
account. 21
The mouse requires the following elements: (a) The fact of proceeds;
(b) the fact of commingling in a deposit account; and (c) the fact of receipt
during the ten day period. These elements obligate a secured party to
trace its entitlement under section 9-306(4)(d). 22 As a practical matter,
the evidence sufficient to establish these facts often will be a series of
interrelated and temporally proximate events. Part of this burden consists
of demonstrating that there is a deposit account of the debtor "in which
18A deposit account is a demand, time, savings, passbook, or like account
maintained with a bank or like organization; accounts evidenced by a certificate
of deposit are not deposit accounts. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(e). For purposes of this
article, the most important type of deposit account is the checking account. A
checking account is a relationship between a creditor (the customer maintaining
the account) and a debtor (the bank). See id. §§ 4-104(l)(e), 4-401 to -407. See
generally B. CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT
CARDS 2.1 (rev. ed. 1981). Deposit accounts are excluded from the scope of
Article Nine unless they are claimed as proceeds. U.C.C. § 9-104(1). Under the
mouse, a secured party also may recover commingled proceeds in the form of
cash. Id. § 9-306(4)(d).
19Voluntary and involuntary cases under the Bankruptcy Code are
commenced by filing a petition with the bankruptcy court. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301,
303 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). This filing establishes the institution of insolvency
proceedings for purposes of determining the commencement of the mouse's 10
day period. See, e.g., In re Conklin's, Inc., 14 Bankr. 318, 320 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1981). U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d) is not applicable to postpetition cash proceeds
recoverable by the secured party pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986). See, e.g., Max] Sales Co. v. Critiques, Inc., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d
(Callaghan) 1338, 1347-49 (10th Cir. 1986); In re Hugo, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1811, 1816-17 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).
20See U.C.C. § 9-306(1).
21See supra note 18.
22The secured party has the ultimate burden of persuasion with respect to its
right to recover commingled cash proceeds. E.g., In re Conklin's, Inc., 14 Bankr.
318, 323 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981). See generally 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
502.02 (15th ed. 1980) [hereinafter COLLIER].
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proceeds have been commingled with other funds." 23 Another part
requires proof of the amount of "any cash proceeds received by the
debtor" 24 during the mouse's ten day period.
It is always necessary to demonstrate that cash or checks are proceeds
received upon the disposition of collateral and are themselves collateral.
2 5
In the case of inventory financing, therefore, it is necessary to prove that
cash or checks resulted from the sale of inventory subject to the financer's
security interest. A paper trail consisting of cash receipt journals, sales
invoices, or bank statements, tied together by the debtor's testimony, can
establish this link. 2 6 If the original collateral consists of accounts
receivable, then comparable documentation may establish that some of
the debtor's receipts consist of payments made by account debtors. 27 The
proof that cash or checks are proceeds, as required by section 9-306(4)(d),
is identical to that required to identify proceeds in cases where the mouse
is inapplicable because there is no insolvency proceeding.
2 8
23U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d).
241d.
25See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (" 'proceeds' includes whatever is received upon the
sale, exchange, collection, or other disposition of collateral or proceeds."); Id.
§ 9-105(1)(c) ("Collateral means the property subject to a security
interest . . . ."). This requirement has been controversial. Arizona Wholesale
Supply Co. v. Itule (In re Gibson Products), 543 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977), held that the words "any cash proceeds received
by the debtor" in § 9-306(4)(d) refer to receipts from any source and are not*
limited by the definition of proceeds in § 9-306(1). This holding has been the
subject of richly deserved criticism. See Skilton, supra note 1, at 70-72; Note,
Bankrupting the Proceeds Section: Recent Interpretations of Section 9-306(4)(d) of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 55 TEX. L. REV. 891, 899-901 (1977). Other cases have
correctly required proof that cash proceeds be traceable to original collateral. See,
e.g., Peoples State Bank v. San Juan Packers (In re San Juan Packers), 696 F.2d
707, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Fitzpatrick v. Philco Finance Corp.,
491 F.2d 1288, 1291-92 (7th Cir. 1974); In re Guaranteed Muffler Supply Co.,
29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 285 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
26See, e.g., In re Dexter Buick-GMC Truck Co., 2 Bankr. 242, (Bankr.
D.R.I. 1980); In re Gibson, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1193 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 1969).
27See In re Barkley Bank of Lansing, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1378, 1382 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1983). "Account debtor" means the person
obligated on an account receivable. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(a).
28See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) ("Except where this article otherwise provides, a
security interest . . . continues in any identifiable proceeds . . . .") (emphasis
added). Identification requires the secured party to trace proceeds to original
collateral. E.g., Norfolk Production Credit Assoc. v. Bank of Norfolk, 220 Neb.
593, 597-98, 371 N.W.2d 276, 279 (1985). Identification is necessary in
insolvency proceedings to recover uncommingled proceeds. See U.C.C. § 9-
306(4)(a)-(c).
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The term "commingled" is not defined by the Code, but is used in its
ordinary sense of "mixed together."29 Thus, cash proceeds deposited in a
bank account will be commingled if they are mixed with funds resulting
from either the debtor's disposal of noncollateral or from other sources. 30
A secured party may initially elect to prove the absence of commingling,
thereby opening the door to a recovery not limited by the mouse's ten day
formula. 3 1 Conversely, a bankruptcy trustee might seek to demonstrate
both commingling and no receipt of proceeds during the ten day period. 32
The word commingled connotes nothing with respect to whether it is
permissible to identify cash or checks deposited into an account by means
of extra-Code tracing techniques.3 3 The LIBR has been successfully
invoked by secured parties in noninsolvency cases involving commingled
29"Commingled" generally refers to the mixing of fungibles. See U.C.C.
§§ 1-201(17), 7-207, 9-205, 9-207, 9-315. This is the intended usage when goods
are involved. See Peoples State Bank v. San Juan Packers, Inc. (In re San Juan
Packers), 696 F.2d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1983) (interpreting U.C.C. § 9-315). Final
credits in the debtor's bank account are not only acceptable commercial
equivalents, i.e., fungibles, but are perfect economic substitutes. Accordingly, a
third party seeking payment from the debtor would be equally satisfied by any
credit in the account. See generally G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 31 (3d
ed. 1966).
3 See In re Trans-Texas Petroleum Corp., 33 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1983); In re Gibson, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1193 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1969). Commingling might also result when hitherto uncommingled proceeds in
a deposit account are designated by the debtor as belonging to a third party. See
In re Jameson's Foods, Inc., 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1381 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 1983) (nonproceeds were also deposited in the account). Such
"commingling by designation" arguably occurs when the debtor draws payroll
checks against the account, but retains funds representing withheld income taxes
in the account. These taxes might be viewed as belonging to the employee or the
Internal Revenue Service. This is not the form of physical commingling
envisioned by the drafters of Article Nine. See supra note 29.
A debtor's access to an account may bear on the question of whether the
account is a "separate" deposit account containing only proceeds, which is not
subject to the mouse. It may not be separate if the debtor has a right to draw
checks. Cf Salzer v. Victor Lynn Corp., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 208
(N.H. Sup. Ct. 1974) (applying the 1962 Official Text of the Uniform
Commercial Code). But see Skilton, supra note 1, at 66-70.
3iSee U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(a)-(c). A bank account proven to contain only
proceeds is not subject to the ten day rule. See In reJCM Cooperative, 8 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 247, 250-51 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1970).
32These facts bar recovery by the secured party. See In re Glaubinger Mach.
Co., 58 Bankr. 38 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
33Equating "commingled" with "nonidentifiable" was part of the
erroneous reasoning in Arizona Wholesale Supply Co. v. Itule (In re Gibson
Products), 543 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1976). See supra note 25.
ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW / 1989
proceeds. 3 4 If section 9-306(4)(d) prohibits use of the LIBR in
bankruptcy, it is because the security interest is "only in" commingled
cash proceeds to the extent provided by the ten day formula.
35
The ten day formula limits the secured party's recovery to proceeds
"received" by the debtor. Received is not defined by the Code. The
mouse's drafters probably assumed that proceeds would be physically
received. They were animated by a vision of a debtor who, on the eve of
bankruptcy, is desperately selling inventory and obtaining cash proceeds
in order to pay trade creditors, employees, taxes, and other debts.
36
However, nothing in the statute rules out the possibility of constructive
receipt. 3 7 Furthermore, nothing in the statute requires the debtor to make
the deposit that results in commingling.
34See infra note 43.
35See, e.g., Coachman Indus. v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank of Shenandoah,
35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1012 (Iowa 1983). The words "only in" were
added to the Code in 1972 to clarify that the claim to cash allowed by the mouse
in insolvency is "exclusive of any other claim based on tracing." A.L.I. &
NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT
AND COMMENTS OF ARTICLE 9 SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND CONFORMING
AMENDMENTS TO RELATED SECTIONS WITH SUPPLEMENTARY TEXT
SHOWING ADDITIONS AND DELETIONS AND STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR
CHANGES MADE 214 (1972). This was stated to be the intent of earlier versions
of U.C.C. § 9-306 (1977). See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, FINAL REPORT 221 (1971). The mouse's
drafting history supports this conclusion. See infra text accompanying notes 92-
113.
36See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 1339. Cf U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(c).
37The general rule is that a security interest "continues in any identifiable
proceeds . . . received by the debtor." U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1977) (emphasis added).
A debtor's receipt is a condition to the continuation of a security interest in
proceeds. However, the term is broadly defined so that it extends to transferees of
collateral subject to a security interest. Id. § 9-105(1)(c), (d). See R. HILLMAN, J.
MCDONNELL & S. NICKLES, COMMON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 22.05[1][b] (1985). Constructive receipt is
permissible under the general rule. See R. HENSON, supra note 8, at 227-28.
Section 9-306(4)(d) is an exception to the general rule because it prohibits the
identification of commingled proceeds. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
However, it too should be interpreted to encompass proceeds constructively
received on behalf of the debtor by a third person. For example, proceeds wired
directly to the debtor's checking account, which are available for withdrawal,
surely have been received by the debtor even though the debtor never had
physical possession of cash or a check. The issue of whether proceeds were
received by the debtor may be coterminous with the issue of whether the funds
were commingled in "deposit accounts of the debtor," as also required by
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The mouse does not require the secured party to prove that proceeds
received during the ten days were commingled. For example, assume the
debtor receives ten thousand dollars of proceeds during the ten day
period, one cent of which is deposited in an account, which thereby
becomes commingled. (The account previously contained
nonproceeds.) 38 The secured party can recover up to ten thousand dollars
from that account even if the debtor has dissipated the other $9,999.99 of
proceeds. 39 If the account contained commingled proceeds and
nonproceeds prior to the ten day period, the secured party can recover up
to ten thousand dollars, even if none of the ten thousand dollars of
proceeds is deposited.
40
B. The LIBR
The LIBR is an aspect of restitutionary tracing theory that provides a
right to reimbursement from a bank account in which a person has
wrongfully commingled funds of another with their own funds. 41 The
victim may also be entitled to restitutionary relief against funds
transferred from the commingled account or their product.4 2 The LIBR
enjoys judicial support as an extra-Code means to "identify" cash
proceeds in nonbankruptcy cases. 4 3 Identification in the context of cash
§ 9-306(4)(d). Cf. In re Armstrong, 56 Bankr. 781, 788 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1986) (holding under the 1962 Official U.C.C. Text that proceeds deposited in a
court account were not received by the debtor so as to terminate automatic
perfection under § 9-306(3), and that the account was not an account of the
debtor under § 9-306(4)(d)).
38For purposes of § 9-306(4), once an account is commingled for the first
time it can never be cleansed of commingling through the application of an extra-
Code tracing methodology such as the LIBR. See infra notes 82-84 and
accompanying text.
39See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 1339; Skilton, supra note 1, at 76-77.
40See E. FARNSWORTH & J. HONNOLD, COMMERCIAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 931 (4th ed. 1985)
4 iSee RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 7, at §§ 209-13;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 38 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984).
The LIBR and related doctrine also are part of the law of trusts. See infra note 43.
42See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 7, at § 211.
43General principles of law and equity supplement Article Nine unless
displaced by a particular Code provision. See U.C.C. § 1-103. Displacement may
have to be "explicit." See id. at comment 1. One analytic route for invoking the
LIBR and related doctrine is to reason that the term "identify" in U.C.C. § 9-
306(2) incorporates extra-Code tracing principles or, at least, that it does not
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proceeds means determining the dimensions of the security interest in the
commingled account, in a transfer of funds from the account, or in assets
purchased with the transferred funds. A creditor is secured to the extent
that proceeds can be identified.
4 4
The wrongdoing requisite to restitutionary relief might be found in
the debtor's act of commingling cash proceeds. In addition, even if the
secured party authorizes or acquiesces in the commingling, a subsequent
unauthorized transfer of funds from the account may still amount to a
wrongful misappropriation of the secured party's property.4 5 In using
restitutionary theory to identify cash proceeds, the requirement of a
wrongful act should be considered in light of the special environment of
secured financing. The secured party's claim should be controlled by
displace them. See C.O. Funk & Sons v. Sullivan Equip., 89 Ill. 2d 27, 431
N.E.2d 370 (1982). Alternatively, tracing may be a remedy implemented
through remedial devices such as equitable liens or constructive trusts. See
Oesterle, supra note 2, at 172, 184. This suggests that restitutionary remedies are
types of judicial enforcement available to Article Nine secured parties. See infra
notes 124-27 and accompanying text. Some of the cases employing the LIBR and
related tracing doctrine to identify cash proceeds find it in the law of trusts, while
others find it in the law of restitution. Compare C.O. Funk & Sons v. Sullivan
Equip., 89 Ill. 2d 27, 431 N.E.2d 370 (1982) (restitution) with Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (trust). The
purpose of these principles under either body of law is to prevent unjust
enrichment, and they are applicable to wrongful transfers by nonfiduciaries. See
generally RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 7, at § 202 comment b; D.
DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES 423 (1973); 1 G. PALMER, THE
LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.3, at 12-16, § 2.14, at 180-81 (1978); 5 A. SCOTT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS 3417-18, 3610-11 (3d ed. 1967). The subsumption of trust
tracing doctrine by restitution is described in Gesterle, supra note 2, at 186-91.
This article focuses on the LIBR and associated tracing principles because of
their acceptance in trust and restitution law and as extra-Code means of
identifying commingled cash proceeds. It does not consider other tracing
methods such as "first-in, first-out," see Clayton's Case, 1 Mer. 572, 34 Eng.
Rep. 781 (1816), or probability theory, see Finkelstein & Robbins, A Probabilistic
Approach to Tracing Presumptions in the Law of Restitution, 24 JURIMETRICS J. 65
(1983).
4"Restitutionary methods and relief are available only to vindicate a
misappropriated interest in property. See generally Oesterle, supra note 2, at 173,
177-80 (listing types of property and types of misappropriation which may trigger
restitutionary relief). They may be employed to measure liability for
misapplication of proceeds. See, e.g., Domain Indus. v. First Sec. Bank & Trust
Co., 230 N.W.2d 165, 168-69 (Iowa 1975). See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 43,
at 421-23.
45See Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317
(E.D. Mo. 1973).
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Article Nine and related case authority because they provide the
governing framework for security interests. 4 6 In general, this means that
sufficient wrongdoing exists for a secured party to invoke the LIBR and
related restitutionary doctrine if the debtor's conduct with respect to the
collateral was not authorized by the secured party.47
Restitutionary tracing can define the size of a security interest in
funds withdrawn from a commingled account or their product. 48 The
order of deposits into the account and the order of withdrawals from the
account are irrelevant. 49 Consider the following example:
46Article Nine validates security agreements that permit the debtor to
commingle, use, or dispose of proceeds. See U.C.C. § 9-205. However, nothing
in the Code requires the debtor to have physical access to proceeds or prevents a
debtor from agreeing to restrictions upon its control over proceeds. Cf id. §§ 1-
102(3), 9-502(1). The scope of a debtor's authority to transfer proceeds may be
defined by the security agreement (e.g., a clause requiring the deposit of proceeds
in a special account under the sole control of the secured party) or by conduct
(e.g., given such a clause, the secured party acquiesces in the debtor's use of a
general account).
47Authorization by the secured party to transfer proceeds in the security
agreement ''or otherwise" results in loss of the right to recover them. See U.C.C.
§§ 9-105(1)(c), 9-306(2). Unauthorized dispositions frequently constitute acts of
default under the security agreement and give rise to tort liability. See R.
HILLMAN, J. MCDONNELL & S. NICKLES, supra note 37, at 22.01(1)(b). A
person who has incurred tort liability as a result of conversion owes restitution.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION, supra note 41, at § 45 comment
g. Whether a disposition of collateral was authorized can be a close question. See,
e.g., Hedrick Savings Bank v. Myers, 229 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1975). The right to
proceeds also may be lost because of a priority rule. See infra text accompanying
notes 117-22, 140-53. Extended or multiple failures to halt a debtor's wrongful
acts might give rise to claims of laches or estoppel. See U.C.C. § 1-103. See
generally D. DOBBS, supra note 43, at 41-44. These defenses also must be
assimilated to the special environment of Article Nine, see supra text
accompanying notes 45-46, and often may prove insufficient against perfected
secured claims. See R. HILLMAN, J. MCDONNELL & S. NICKLES, supra note 37,
at 24.04(2).
48See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 7, at § 211. This principle
also provides a claim against funds remaining in the commingled account, which
is displaced by the mouse in insolvency proceedings, but not in other cases. See
U.C.C. §§ 9-306(2), 9-306(4)(d).
49See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 7, at § 211 comments a,
b. See generally DOBBS, supra note 43, at 427-29; 1 G. PALMER, supra note 43,
§ 2.16, at 201-07.
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Deposit of debtor's funds $1,000
Deposit of proceeds 1,000
Balance 2,000
Transfer from the deposit account (1,500)
Balance $ 500
Provided that the transfer is not authorized by the secured party, the
transferred funds are encumbered by the secured party's rights to the
extent of one thousand dollars. 50 Assets acquired with the funds by the
transferee would be encumbered by the same amount. 51
The right to funds or their product defined by tracing is characterized
by the law of restitution as an equitable lien securing reimbursement or as
a constructive trust. 52 Once imposed, these restitutionary rights may be
judicially enforced. For example, an equitable lien may be enforced
against a wrongdoer's bank account by a court order to pay the claimant
out of the account. 53 Therefore, through commingled fund tracing a
secured party not only can identify funds as proceeds subject to a security
interest, but also can enforce recovery from the account in the identified
amount. It is important to note that security interests and equitable liens
or constructive trusts are not equivalents. The former are specialized
property rights governed by Article Nine. 54 The latter consist of extra-
50See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 7, at § 211.
51See id.
52RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 7, at § 211(1), (2). The
choice of remedy generally is left to the claimant. Id. § 211(2). If the debtor knew
it was acting wrongfully, the secured party would be entitled to a proportionate
share either of the part withdrawn or of its product measured according to a ratio
between the proceeds and the whole amount of the account. Id. This amounts to
the imposition of a constructive trust. Id. § 211 comment d. An equitable lien
may be more appropriate when restitution is sought against property belonging
only partly to the claimant, such as a bank account containing commingled cash
proceeds. See Department of Natural Resources v. Benjamin, 41 Colo. App. 520,
587 P.2d 1207 (1978); D. DOBBS, supra note 43, at 249-50. See generally
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra, at § 161 comment a; 1 G. PALMER,
supra note 43, § 2.14, at 176-77, § 2.16, at 207-14; 5 A. SCOTT, supra note 43, at
3425-26, 3613-14.
53See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 7, at § 161 comment b; I
G. PALMER, supra note 43, at § 1.5(a).
54Article Nine uses the term "lien" to describe interests that arise without
the consent of the person against whom they are enforceable (e.g., judgment or
artisans' liens). See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-102(1), 9-301(3), 9-310. The term
"security interest" describes consensual interests in personal property securing
an obligation. See id. Liens generally are not governed by Article Nine, but
security interests are. See id.
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Code remedies available to claimants who can trace. A secured party may
obtain an equitable lien or constructive trust because a security interest in
identifiable proceeds can be foreclosed or enforced by any available
judicial procedure, including those that result in a lien. 55 This distinction
is significant because it reinforces the primacy of Article Nine in deciding
issues such as whether a security interest is perfected or has priority over a
third party.
5 6
Secured parties that trace may encounter untraceable withdrawals
and subsequent additions to a commingled account. The LIBR focuses on
this problem by treating commingled proceeds as oil floating on top of
nonproceeds that consist of water.57 All the nonproceeds drain from the
bottom of the account before the proceeds are depleted. 58 Consider the
following new example:
Deposit of debtor's funds $1,000
Deposit of proceeds 1,000
Balance 2,000
Untraceable transfer from the account (1,500)
Balance 500
Deposit of debtor's funds 2,000
Balance 2,500
Unauthorized transfer to X (1,000)
Balance $1,500
If the secured party's rights are fixed at this point, 59 its security interest
against the bank account or the funds transferred to X cannot exceed the
55See U.C.C. § 9-501(1), (5). Under the UCC, a defective security interest
may not be salvageable on the theory that it is an equitable lien. See id. § 9-203
comment 5. However, a secured party armed with an enforceable and perfected
security interest may employ equitable remedies against the debtor or third
parties. See In re Atlantic Mortgage Corp., 69 Bankr. 321, 330 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. S.D. 1987). The details of these remedies are generally left to extra-Code
law. See generally infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
56See infra notes 140-53 and accompanying text.
57Concerning the oil and water metaphor, see D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON,
TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS
ON SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 130 (2d ed. 1987).
58 d.
59Rights will be fixed at the time an insolvency proceeding is instituted. See 1
G. PALMER, supra note 43, at 197 n.6; see also supra note 19 and accompanying
text.
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amount of the lowest intermediate balance, which is five hundred
dollars. 60 The untraceable transfer first drained one thousand dollars of
nonproceeds, and then five hundred dollars of proceeds. The second
deposit of the debtor's funds does not replenish the security interest unless
the debtor manifests an intent to make restitution. 6 1 Absent such an
intent, the lien would be extinguished if the unrecoverable transfer was
two thousand dollars because the lowest intermediate balance would be
zero. 62 A transfer may be untraceable because there is only sketchy
evidence of where the money went. It also may be untraceable because it
was received by a person with priority over the secured creditor.6 3 The
LIBR protects the debtor's general creditors by placing a limit upon the
right to restitution.
6 4
60See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 7, at § 212. Many banks
maintain a daily record of account activity, which could facilitate determining the
lowest intermediate balance. See Zubrow, Integration of Deposit Account Financing
into Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 68
MINN. L. REV. 899, 918-19 (1984). See generally 1 G. PALMER, supra note 43,
§ 2.16, at 200-01. Day's end balances may be appropriate for applying the LIBR
to active accounts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION, supra note 41, at
§ 38 comment d.
In permitting a victim to trace into the funds remaining in a commingled
account, some courts justify the LIBR with the fiction that a wrongdoer first
withdraws its own funds. This is the basis for the "oil and water" metaphor. See
supra note 57 and accompanying text. Depletion of the victim's funds does not
commence until the wrongdoer's funds are exhausted. See D. DOBBS, supra note
43, at 428. It may seem logical to apply this fiction in a case in which the victim
seeks to recover funds withdrawn from the account or their product. See R.
HILLMAN, J. MCDONNELL & S. NICKLES, supra note 37, at 22.05(3)(a);
Zubrow, supra, at 959. The victim would have no claim to withdrawn funds until
the lowest intermediate balance in the account falls below the amount of the
victim's funds deposited in the account. However, the Restatement of
Restitution and a majority of American courts hold that withdrawn funds may be
subject to the victim's restitutionary rights regardless of the sequence of
withdrawals. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 7, at § 211; 1 G.
PALMER, supra note 43, § 2.16, at 203-07.
61See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 7, at § 212 comment c.
62Seeid. comment a. See generally 1 G. PALMER, supra note 43, § 2.16, at 205.
63For example, a debtor might withdraw cash from the commingled account
which is "used up" in the debtor's business. Even if the identity of all the
transferees could be determined, they may be legitimate creditors entitled to
priority over the secured party. See Mattson v. Commercial Credit Business
Loans, Inc., 301 Or. 407, 415, 723 P.2d 996, 1001 (1986).
64See generally 1 G. PALMER, supra note 43, § 2.14, at 182-86. The secured
party should not be required to make an election between pursuing its
restitutionary rights against either the debtor's account or the transferred funds.
See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 7, at § 147.
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Two corollaries of the LIBR are worth mentioning. Starting with the
previous example (in which the lowest intermediate balance is five
hundred dollars), assume the following additional transactions occur
before the secured party's rights are fixed:
Account balance from previous example $1,500
Deposit of proceeds 500
Interest credited to the account 10
Balance 2,010
Unauthorized transfer to Y (1,000)
The size of the security interest in the funds transferred to X, the first
unauthorized transferee, is not affected by the subsequent deposit of
proceeds or the interest credit. 6 5 The LIBR protects X's general creditors
by limiting the size of the security interest in funds transferred to X.
6 6
However, the secured party's rights against the debtor's bank account or
Y are increased by the amount of the second deposit of proceeds and some
of the interest. The security interest is not limited in size to the previous
lowest intermediate balance when subsequent deposits to the account
consist of proceeds. 67 The secured party's potential recovery also should
be increased by any profit earned by the account, such as interest credited
by the depository institution, to the extent that it is attributable to funds
identified with the security interest. 68 The maximum that a secured party
may identify by tracing cannot exceed the amount of the secured
indebtedness.69
Cases may arise in which the debtor commingles cash proceeds in its
deposit account and then transfers funds from the account to a transferee.
The debtor becomes bankrupt and the secured party claims that it is
entitled to funds in the transferee's possession as well as funds in the bank
account. It is generally accepted that Article Nine provides an asymmetric
constellation of entitlements: Section 9-306(4)(d) applies in insolvency
proceedings; restitutionary tracing, including the LIBR, applies in other
65See 1 G. PALMER, supra note 43, § 2.16, at 205; 5 A. SCOTT, supra note 43,
at 3627-28.
66See supra note 64.
67See 5 A. SCOTT, supra note 43, at 3636.
68See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 7, at § 212 comment b;
D. DOBBS, supra note 43, at 423.
69See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-105(1).
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cases. 70 Assuming that neither the mouse nor the Bankruptcy Code cut
off the secured party's right to identify the transferred funds, 71 the mouse
and restitutionary tracing can be applied to measure the secured party's
recovery from the account and the transferee, respectively. There is no
conflict between the two entitlements provided that the secured party is
not permitted to recover twice on account of proceeds received during the
mouse's ten day period.
72
70See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
71See infra text accompanying notes 73-239, in which these assumptions are
examined.
72For example:
Premouse Period
Employ the LIBR to determine the amount of proceeds (P) and nonproceeds
(NP) in the account at the end of this period. This period commences upon the
date of the first act of commingling relied upon by the plaintiff, and ends at the
start of the mouse's ten day period. See supra notes 41-64 and accompanying text.
Assume P = $1,000 and NP = $1,000.
The Mouse's Ten Day Period
This is the ten day period in § 9-306(4)(d). P = $1,000 and NP = $1,000 at the
start of this period. This example assumes that all proceeds received during the
period are commingled in the account, although this is not required by the
mouse. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. The mouse does not impair
a secured party's right to identify proceeds transferred from the commingled
account prior to bankruptcy to a non good faith purchaser. See infra notes 108-14
and accompanying text.
Balance $2,000
Deposit of proceeds 1,000
Deposit of debtor's funds 1,000
Balance 4,000
Non-traceable transfer (2,500)
Deposit of debtor's funds 1,000
Unauthorized transfer to Z (2,000)
Balance 500
Restitutionary tracing limits the secured party's maximum recovery from Z
to $1,500-the lowest intermediate balance prior to the transfer. See supra notes
57-59 and accompanying text. The secured party has no right to reach the
debtor's bank account under restitutionary principles because they are displaced
to that extent by § 9-306(4)(d). See supra note 35 and accompanying text. The
secured party's maximum recovery from the debtor's bank account is limited by
the mouse to $1,000-the amount of proceeds received during the ten day
period. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. The secured party should not be
given double recovery simply because the $1,000 of proceeds were deposited
during the ten day period. It may be allowed to use these proceeds in support of
either its tracing based or mouse based claim, but not in support of both claims.
An alternative approach might credit any recovery from the bank account
(transferee) against any recovery from the transferee (bank account). This may
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III. ROLES, PRIORITY, AND RELIEF: RESTITUTION AND
ARTICLE NINE
It is generally, but not universally, accepted that Article Nine provides
an asymmetric constellation of entitlements to commingled funds.
73 In
the event of insolvency proceedings, section 9-306(4)(d) defines the
secured party's recovery from cash or deposit accounts of the debtor in
which proceeds have been commingled with other funds. Both the LIBR
and related restitutionary tracing doctrine define the entitlement to funds
of the debtor containing commingled proceeds when there is no
insolvency proceeding.
The question of what entitlement applies to funds which are no longer
of the debtor because the debtor transferred them to a third party is
independent of whether these definitions are correct. Logic might suggest
that once bankruptcy intervenes, section 9-306(4)(d) cuts off secured
claims to the transferred funds. The mouse displaces a secured party's
right to trace into a commingled account by means of extra-Code tracing
rules. Following funds out of the account and into a transferee's hands
would require commingled fund tracing. Therefore, there can be no right
to recover from the transferee. Article Nine may support this reasoning. It
provides that in the event of bankruptcy, the secured claim is only in what
is expressly recoverable under the mouse, and the mouse does not provide
for the recovery of proceeds transferred out of the debtor's commingled
deposit account. 7 4 On the other hand, section 9-306(4)(d) may be neutral
with respect to cash proceeds transferred prior to bankruptcy, neither
aiding nor hindering the secured party. The secured party would then be
free to employ restitution to identify the transferred funds. It might also
seem analogous to reducing the secured party's recovery from the account under
the mouse by the amount of payments to the secured party on account of cash
proceeds received by the debtor during the mouse's ten day period. See U.C.C.
§ 9-306(4)(d)(ii). However, the analogy is imperfect. Recovery from the account
pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d) does not require actual commingling of
proceeds received during the ten day period. See supra notes 39-40 and
accompanying text. Restitutionary tracing requires commingling. See supra note
41 and accompanying text.
73See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
74See U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (1977).
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be argued that the mouse defines or limits the claim to the transferred
funds, but does not cut it off. 
7 5
Uncertainty concerning secured claims to commingled funds is not
limited to the entitlements. Issues of priority, relief, and restitution's
general role in Article Nine also are opaquely perceived or resolved.
A. The Courts and Commingling
Case law generally supports the traditional view of Article Nine's
asymmetric entitlements to commingled funds not transferred by the
debtor: extra-Code tracing is available except in bankruptcy, where it is
preempted by section 9-306(4)(d). 76 However, there are divergent views
concerning the entitlement applicable when a security interest is asserted
against transferred funds in a third party's hands. One view is reflected in
First National Bank of Amarillo v. Martin. 77 The debtor's sale of goods over a
leased department store counter was financed by a bank ("Secured
Party") with a security interest in the debtor's inventory. Sales by the
debtor were processed through the store's registers. The store made
monthly accountings, deducted a percentage rental, and paid the
75A transferee of commingled cash proceeds subject to a security interest is a
"debtor" even though the transferee is not liable for the obligation secured. See
supra note 37. Therefore, the mouse might define a secured party's entitlement in
the case of a bankrupt transferee's commingled cash and deposit accounts.
However, the Code's drafting history indicates that § 9-306(4)(d) was envisioned
as applicable only to "original debtors" liable for the secured obligation. See infra
notes 92-113 and accompanying text.
The mouse also might be read to require secured parties to monitor original
debtors not less than every ten days, in order to discover improper transfers of
cash proceeds received during that period. Failure to do so results in the loss of
any claim to the transferred funds. In effect, the mouse functions as a statute of
limitations as well as a limit on secured claims to untransferred cash proceeds.
There are several problems with this reading. First, ten days is a short time to
discover the receipt and transfer of proceeds and take action to preserve the
claim. Second, the necessary action (e.g., filing suit, sending written notice to the
transferee and so on) is not specified. Third, the mouse does not contain typical
Code statute of limitations phraseology (e.g., "an action must . . . be
commenced"). Cf U.C.C. §§ 2-725, 6-111. Early drafts of the Code contain a
time-based limit on recovering transferred cash proceeds, but this approach was
dropped. See infra note 95.
76See, e.g. Fitzpatrick v. Philco Fin. Corp., 491 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974);
First Nat'l Bank of Amarillo v. Martin, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1521
(S.D. Tex. 1985), rev'g, In re Martin, 25 Bankr. 25 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
7740 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1521 (S.D. Tex. 1985), rev'g, In re
Martin, 25 Bankr. 25 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982). The facts are set forth in the
opinion of the bankruptcy judge.
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remaining balance to the debtor. The debtor customarily deposited the
store's checks in her business checking account with Secured Party. Her
revenue was seasonal, with the greatest sales occurring around
Christmas.
7 8
As bankruptcy approached, the debtor cashed the check covering
most of her 1980 Christmas sales at another bank ("Bank Two"), and
placed the monies in a safe deposit box at that bank. There was no
commingling of proceeds with nonproceeds in the box. A little over sixty
percent of the cash was then deposited in a joint checking account that the
debtor shared with her husband at a third bank ("Bank Three").
79 There
was commingling in this account. After some of the funds in this account
were dissipated, the debtor and her husband executed an agreement
781n re Martin, 25 Bankr. at 26.
791d. at 26-27. The action in the various bank accounts may be reconstructed
as follows. All dates are in 1981. The bankruptcy petition was filed on March 4.
For a discussion of how to calculate the LIBR, see supra text accompanying notes
57-69.
Joint Account at Bank Three
Date Deposit/Withdrawal Balance
2/13 +5,082 (from safe deposit box) $ 4,957.36
2/18 + 6,860 (from safe deposit box) 11,817.36
(lowest intermediate balance 10,684.10
between 2/18 and 2/23)
.2/? + 29.46 (from ?) 10,713.56 
"
2/23 -5,356.78 (to Bank Four) 5,356.78
(lowest intermediate balance 4,200
between 2/23 and 4/17)
4/17 -4,200 (to husband's account ? (probably 0)
at Bank Three)
*The bankruptcy court's opinion does not explain this increase in the
account balance. The district court reasoned that it can be accounted for by
including nonproceeds deposits on February 23 and subtracting the checks that
were outstanding on that day. Whatever its source, the account must have been
increased by this amount if it was partitioned into equal halves of $5,356.78 on
February 23.
Debtor's Account at Bank Four
Date Deposit/Withdrawal Balance
2/23 +5,356.78 $5,356.78
(lowest intermediate balance $5,268.79
between 2/23 and 3/4)t
tThe debtor deposited $378.78 from the second department store check on
an unspecified date after February 20. $100 from an undetermined source was
deposited on March 12 after bankruptcy.
Husband's Account at Bank Three
Date Deposit/Withdrawal Balance
4/17 +4,200
(lowest intermediate balance after 4/17 was never less than $4,200).
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partitioning the remainder of the account in half. The debtor placed her
half in a new account opened in her name at a fourth bank ("Bank
Four").8 0 Part of the husband's half that remained in Bank Three was
dissipated before he placed the balance in an account in his name at Bank
Three. A second proceeds check covering the balance of the 1980
Christmas sales was cashed by the debtor at Bank Two. Some of these
funds were paid to the debtor's attorney, with the balance deposited in the
debtor's account at Bank Four. The debtor admitted that she intended to
remove all the monies, or at least the husband's half of the joint account,
from bankruptcy administration. 81
On appeal, the district court correctly read section 9-306(4) to permit
the recovery of proceeds deposited in a bank account by means of two
routes: (1) Where the account is shown to be a separate deposit account
containing only proceeds; and (2) by application of the mouse. 8 2 The first
route was foreclosed to Secured Party because of commingling in the joint
account at Bank Three. 83 The bankruptcy court's decision, allowing
Secured Party to employ the LIBR to trace through this account to show
that the debtor's and her husband's accounts were separate and contained
only proceeds, was inconsistent with the mouse's preemption of extra-
Code tracing methods in bankruptcy. None of the accounts were separate
in the sense of being specifically created and used only for the deposit of
proceeds. 84 However, the district court deemed the LIBR an appropriate
8°See supra note 79.
81See supra note 79.
82First Nat'l Bank of Amarillo, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1521. See
U.C.C. § 9-306(4). The bankruptcy court permitted Secured Party to recover
$9,468.79. In re Martin, 25 Bankr. at 29. This consisted of the lowest
intermediate balance of $5,268.79 in the debtor's Bank Four account and the
lowest intermediate balance of $4,200 in the husband's Bank Three account. See
supra note 79.
83First Nat'l Bank of Amarillo, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1525.
This account apparently contained at least $29.46 of nonproceeds. See supra note
79.
84FirstNat'lBankofAmarillo, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1525. The
district court reasoned that the Bank Four account was commingled because it
contained some of the nonproceeds deposited in the joint account at Bank Three.
See supra note 79.
SECURED AND RESTITUTIONARY CLAIMS TO COMMINGLED FUNDS 289
means for identifying transferred funds in the presence of intentional
wrongful conduct.
85
Martin apparently assumes that section 9-306(4)(d) is neutral with
respect to claims against third parties that may proceed by means of
restitutionary tracing. An alternate view that the mouse limits the amount
recoverable from a transferee is reflected in In re Datair Systems Corp. 
8 6
Datair involved the Chapter Eleven reorganization of a parent
corporation, Datair Systems ("Systems"). A wholly-owned subsidiary,
Datair Financial ("Financial"), was the subject of a separate and
completed Chapter Seven liquidation. Systems' assets served as collateral
under a security agreement with the Small Business Administration
("SBA"). A bank held a security interest in Financial's assets, which it
relied upon to reach certain of Systems' computer software and accounts
receivable. 87 There was evidence of cash transfers from Financial to
Systems, and payments to both corporations were deposited in a bank
account in Systems' name. Funds from this account were used to pay
employees and creditors of both corporations depending upon "who
hollered the loudest."' 8 8 The bank claimed that it was entitled to a
constructive trust on the software and receivables with priority over the
SBA. 89
The court recognized that the bank was asserting the following
linkage: Assets of Financial (collateral) to funds deposited in the
commingled Systems' account (cash proceeds) to the software and
85First Nat'l Bank of Amarillo, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1526-27.
Although the issue was considered neither in In re Martin, 25 Bankr. at 25,
nor in In re Datair Systems Corp., 42 Bankr. 241 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984),
discussed infra at notes 86-91 and accompanying text, assets recovered by a
trustee pursuant to its avoiding powers from a transferee who received them from
the debtor prior to bankruptcy have been held subject to a prepetition perfected
security interest. See, e.g., In re Figearo, 79 Bankr. 914 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1987)
(funds recovered by trustee from compromise of fraudulent conveyance action
held subject to security interest covering proceeds). But see In re Integrated
Testing Products Corp., 69 Bankr. 901 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1987) (funds recovered
by trustee in preference actions held not subject to security interest covering
proceeds). U.C.C. § 9-306(4) does not govern the postpetition effect of security
interests. See supra note 19.
86In re Datair Systems Corp., 42 Bankr. 241 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984).
87The bank also had a separate perfected security interest in Systems' assets
over which the SBA apparently had priority as the first to file. Id. at 242-43. See
U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a). Datair is concerned with the administration of assets in
Systems' estate. It did not involve a substantive consolidation or a joint
administration. See generally 5 COLLIER, supra note 22, at 1100.06-.07.
aSDatair, 42 Bankr. at 243.
89 d. at 244.
ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW / 1989
receivables (noncash proceeds). Its treatment of the proceeds issues raised
by the bank's claim was more hesitant.9 0 The court ultimately focused on
section 9-306(4)(d) and held that the bank should recover to the extent
that it could demonstrate through documentary evidence that it had an
interest under the mouse's ten day formula. 9 1
B. Lessons from the Mouse's Ancestors
Martin and Datair comport with the traditional view that section 9-
306(4)(d) controls a secured party's entitlement to commingled funds in
the bankruptcy estate of the debtor who created the security interest.
However, they differ concerning the mouse's role in the case of cash
proceeds transferred prior to bankruptcy.
Section 9-306(4)(d)'s drafting history confirms that the traditional
view is the correct one and indicates that the section was not intended to
affect secured claims to funds transferred prior to bankruptcy. It also
provides insight into the remedial and priority scheme envisioned for
these claims.
In examining this drafting history, it is important to recognize that
transferees of commingled cash proceeds often will be "good faith
purchasers" entitled to protection from claims arising prior to the
transfer.92 For example, a transferee of a check drawn on a commingled
account, or of cash withdrawn from the account, can obtain this protected
9 Initially, the court seemed to find controlling U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (claims to
cash proceeds in insolvency proceedings), but it subsequently turned to U.C.C.
§ 9-306(2) (secured party's general right to "identify" proceeds). Relevant state
law permitted identification of commingled proceeds by means of the LIBR, but
the bank's entitlement under this rule apparently was zero. See Datair, 42 Bankr.
at 244-45.
9 1In re Datair Systems Corp., 42 Bankr. at 244. Datair does not reason that
Systems was a "debtor." See supra note 75.92 "Good faith purchaser" is used here in a general sense to refer to a
transferee who is protected against property claims because it took in good faith,
gave value, lacked notice of the claim, or for other reasons. The technically
correct name for the good faith purchaser and the specific requirements for
protection vary according to the type of personalty and the applicable case or
statute law. See infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text. Because this article is
concerned with the rights of secured parties, due attention must be given to
Article Nine's priority scheme, which protects some transferees against secured
claims. See infra notes 140-53 and accompanying text.
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status. 93 Thus, the issue of how the mouse affects a security interest in
transferred funds is most likely to arise in cases like Martin and Datair
where the transfer was colorably out of the ordinary course, and the
proceeds could be traced into the hands of a non good faith purchaser.
9 4
The Uniform Trust Receipts Act ("UTRA") and early commercial
code drafts are the first links in the mouse's lengthy evolutionary chain.
95
93See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
9 4Claims to transferred proceeds will not necessarily be initiated in
insolvency proceedings. The secured party might sue the transferee in a court of
general jurisdiction, in which case the mouse may be irrelevant, at least until the
debtor enters bankruptcy. See U.C.C. 9-306(4)(d).
95See generally Braucher, Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 798, 799 (1958). Section 10(b) of the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act gave a secured party the right to the value of proceeds, whether identifiable
or not, received by the debtor within ten days of bankruptcy. See UNIF. TRUST
RECEIPTS ACT § 10(b), 9C U.L.A. 261 (1957) [hereinafter UTRA]. This right
extended to the general assets of the debtor and was not limited to a bank account
containing cash proceeds. See, e.g., Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Thursbay
Chevrolet Co., 136 So.2d 15, 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962). See generally 2 G.
GILMORE, supra note 4, at 1341-44. The UTRA also afforded a financer an
independent right to recover identifiable proceeds. UTRA § 10(c), 9C U.L.A. at
261. See also id. § 10(a), 9C U.L.A. at 261. Sections 10(b) and 10(c) were
intended to simplify the secured party's proof in insolvency proceedings and
preserve common law tracing rights, possibly including commingled fund tracing
conventions. See UTRA Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9C U.L.A. at 225.
Commingled fund tracing was approved in the common law of trust receipts. See
In re Mulligan, 116 F. 715 (D. Mass. 1902); Frederick, The Trust Receipt as Security
11, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 546, 555-57 (1922). But see Henning, Article Nine's
Treatment of Commingled Cash Proceeds in Non-Insolvency Cases, 35 ARK. L. REV.
192, 211-12 (1981). The UTRA's right to trace followed proceeds into the hands
of a transferee of the debtor, but was cut off by good faith purchasers such as a
holder in due course of commercial paper. UTRA § 9, 9C U.L.A. at 255. See,
e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Associates Discount Corp., 38
N.Y.S.2d 972 (Syracuse Munic. Ct. 1942), rev'don other grounds, 267 A.D. 1032,
48 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1944). It also could be lost if the secured party failed to
demand an accounting by the debtor within ten days of obtaining knowledge of
the existence of the proceeds. UTRA § 10(c), 9C U.L.A. at 261. See generally
Skilton, Cars For Sale: Some Comments on the Wholesale Financing of Automobiles, 1957
Wis. L. REV. 352, 404-08.
UTRA influence on the mouse's U.C.C. ancestors is not surprising, given
that Karl Llewellyn served as draftsman for the UTRA and, as Chief Reporter,
was extensively involved with all sections of the early Code drafts. See W.
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 105, 281, 300-01
(1973). These drafts provided for, inter alia, a formula-based right to the value of
untransferred cash proceeds received by the debtor shortly prior to bankruptcy,
and a right to reclaim cash proceeds transferred to third parties. See A.L.I &
NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, COMMERCIAL CODE
(GROUP No. 3), TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 1, art. VII §§ 17, 18, 19 (Apr. 21,
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They provided financers with a formula-based right to the value of
untransferred cash proceeds received by the debtor prior to bankruptcy,
and an independent right to transferred cash proceeds in third party
hands. 96 Subsequently, the formula-based right was made exclusive in
insolvency proceedings with respect to untransferred cash proceeds. 97
Statutory language and commentary relating to the exclusive
formula-based right clouded a secured party's right to recover transferred
cash proceeds. 98 For example, a Code revision issued in October of 1949
("October 1949 Revision") may evidence an intent to abrogate the right
to transferred cash proceeds in the event of bankruptcy.99 The October
1948) [hereinafter TENTATIVE DRAFT 1]; A.L.I. & NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, COMMERCIAL CODE TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2,
art. VII § 313(1), (4) (Aug. 6, 1948) [hereinafter TENTATIVE DRAFT 2].
Transferred proceeds were impressed with a trust benefiting the secured party,
but good faith purchasers were protected from financers' claims. The right to
recover transferred proceeds also could be lost if the secured party acquiesced in
the debtor's possession of the proceeds for a specified period of time. See
TENTATIVE DRAFT 1, supra, at §§ 14, 17(1), 19; TENTATIVE DRAFT 2, supra, at
§ 313(2), (5). A legitimate creditor did not hold an ordinary course payment
from the debtor as trustee for the secured party. See TENTATIVE DRAFT 1, supra,
at 26-27, 29-30 (General Comments on Sections 17 through 22); A.L.I. & NAT'L
CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, COMMERCIAL CODE NOTES
AND COMMENTS TO TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, art. VII at 20-21 (Aug. 6,
1948).
9 See supra note 95.
97See A.L.I. & NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, MAY 1949 DRAFT § 7-322 (1949) [hereinafter
MAY 1949 DRAFT]. Secured parties were provided with a continuing lien on cash
proceeds received by the debtor. The lien would not be good against persons who
received proceeds for value in the ordinary course. See id. § 7-322(2)(b). In
insolvency proceedings, a financer was given "in lieu of tracing cash proceeds, a
lien on the cash of the borrower equal to the amount of cash proceeds received
within one week prior to bankruptcy and no other right to cash proceeds." Id.
§ 7-322(2)(c). The formula right was intended to clarify the UTRA rule by
specifying that the right was in lieu of tracing and not in addition thereto. Id. at
§ 7-322 comment 2.
9 8 See supra note 97.
99See A.L.I. & NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, OCTOBER 1949 REVISIONS OF SECTION 1-
105; BANK COLLECTIONS PART OF ARTICLE 3; SECTION 6-303; AND ARTICLES
ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND BULK TRANSFERS §§ 8-306, 8-308 (1949)
[hereinafter OCTOBER 1949 REVISION]. The October 1949 Revision also
considered a secured party's priority in transferred proceeds. Previously, the
proceeds sections of Code drafts had contained their own priority rules for
transferred proceeds. See MAY 1949 DRAFT, supra note 97, at § 7-322. The
October 1949 Revision stripped the proceeds specific priority rules from the
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1949 Revision states that a security interest continues on proceeds
received by the debtor, subject to the formula-based recovery provided by
the following mouse ancestor:
In insolvency proceedings a lender has, in lieu of any right to trace cash
proceeds not subjected to his control, a right to the cash and checking
accounts of the debtor equal to the amount of cash proceeds received by
the debtor within one week prior to the institution of such proceedings.
He has no other right to or lien on cash proceeds not subjected to his
control before insolvency proceedings are instituted.100
Accompanying commentary speaks to transferred funds:
[T]he fact that the interest in proceeds is a perfected security interest
does not prevent the proceeds from being disposed of free of the security
interest. Thus, [under the October 1949 Revision] . . . the lender's right
to cash is limited to cash which he subjects to his control. The debtor's
use of cash proceeds to pay his unsecured debts is authorized so that the
unsecured creditor does not hold as "trustee" for the secured
lender. . . . [The October 1949 Revision] also . . . makes clear that the
priority given is in lieu of tracing not in addition thereto.
101
The October 1949 Revision seemingly makes the formula recovery right
in the event of insolvency proceedings exclusive with respect to both
transferred and untransferred cash proceeds, including funds in the
possession of non good faith purchasers. The secured party's failure to
obtain control of the proceeds and the likelihood that many transferees
will be good faith purchasers with priority over the secured party arguably
served as rationales for cutting off all claims against transferees regardless
of their bona fides. 10 2 Nevertheless, there is good reason to question
Code's proceeds provisions which, henceforth, would be read in conjunction with
general priority rules applicable to both proceeds and original collateral. See
OCTOBER 1949 REVISION, supra, §§ 8-306, 8-308. This reflected a substantial
change in policy. Id. This development is significant for this article because it
relates to the priority determinative content of U.C.C. § 9-306. See infra notes
140-53.
10 0 OCTOBER 1949 REVISION, supra note 99, at § 8-306(2).
1°1d. § 8-306 comments 1, 2.
102This resembles an argument made for requiring possession to perfect
security interests in negotiable collateral in order to protect good faith
purchasers. See generally 0. SPIVACK, SECURED TRANSACTIONS 80-82 (3d ed.
1963).
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whether the Code's drafters ever intended to protect non good faith
purchasers against secured claims to commingled cash proceeds under
any circumstances. Such protection was inconsistent with other provisions
in the October 1949 Revision in which bona fides was a prerequisite to the
protection of transferees. 1
03
It is uncertain whether the drafters intentionally abrogated and then
restored the right to recover cash proceeds from non good faith purchasers
in the event of bankruptcy or merely recognized that they had
inadvertently jeopardized the right, although the latter seems more likely.
In any event, the right is recognized in the Official 1952 draft of the Code
("1952 Draft"). 10 4 The 1952 Draft's mouse ancestor also stated that a
secured party had neither a right to nor a lien on cash proceeds not
subjected to its control before bankruptcy. 10 5 However, accompanying
commentary makes clear that it did not affect the right to identify cash
proceeds transferred to non good faith purchasers even if the debtor is
bankrupt:
10 3 See OCTOBER 1949 REVISION, supra note 99, at § 8-308. See also id. § 2-
405, 3-302, 3-305.
1
0 4The process of removing this implication through the adoption of
commentary apparently began in 1950. See A.L.I. & NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PROPOSED FINAL
DRAFT § 9-306 (Text & Comments ed. Spring 1950); Id. comment 2. That this is
what was intended became clear with the 1952 Draft. See A.L.I. & NAT'L CONF.
OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
OFFICIAL DRAFT § 9-306 (Text & Comments ed. 1952) [hereinafter 1952
DRAFT]. The 1952 Draft provided a general right to identify proceeds:
(1) When collateral is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of by the
debtor the security interest continues on any identifiable proceeds received by
the debtor except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) ....
Id. § 9-306(1). This right was subject to the following mouse ancestor:
In insolvency proceedings a secured party with a perfected security interest has a
right to the cash and bank accounts of the debtor equal to the amount of cash
proceeds received by the debtor within ten days before the institution of such
proceedings less the amount of such proceeds received by the debtor and paid
over to the secured party during the ten day period, but no other right to or lien
on cash proceeds not subjected to his control before insolvency proceedings are
instituted . ...
Id. § 9-306(2). Commentary stated that this mouse ancestor applied "whether or
not the funds in the insolvent's possession are identifiable as cash proceeds of the
collateral," is "exclusive," and that because of it the secured party "does not
have the option to claim a greater sum if he is able to identify the greater sum as
cash proceeds of the collateral." Id. § 9-306 comment 2(a). Identical language
was enacted in Pennsylvania where it was stated that the mouse ancestor dealt
only with cash proceeds turned over to a receiver, and did not prevent the
recovery of noncash proceeds acquired with cash proceeds generated prior to the
insolvency proceeding. See Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Warren Lepley
Ford, Inc. (No. 3), 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 395 (1958).
"'5See supra note 104.
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A secured party who leaves proceeds in his debtor's possession acts at his
own risk. If the proceeds are transferred by the debtor in ordinary course
of business, the secured party will in most cases not be able to recapture
the proceeds from such a transferee. [Priority rules in other Article Nine
sections are discussed.[. . . . Where cash proceeds are covered into the debtor's
checking account and paid out in the operation of the debtor's business, recipients of
the funds of course take free of any claim which the secured party may have in them as
proceeds. What has been said relates to payments and transfers in ordinary course.
The law of fraudulent conveyances would no doubt in appropriate cases support
recovery of proceeds by a secured party from a transferee out of ordinary course or
otherwise in collusion with the debtor to defraud the secured party. 106
This comment's reference to the law of fraudulent conveyances indicates
that the 1952 Draft did not in any way limit a financer's recovery of
transferred cash proceeds even if the debtor is bankrupt. Fraudulent
conveyance law protects creditors against debtor misbehavior intended to
hinder, delay, or defraud, and is specifically concerned with conveyances
by persons who are or thereby will be rendered insolvent. 107 Hence, the
comment contemplates secured party recovery of proceeds transferred
prior to bankruptcy.
The nonitalicized portion of the 1952 Draft's Comment Two (c) was
eliminated with the issuance of the 1957 Official Uniform Commercial
Code Text ("1957 Text"). 10 8 The italicized portion became the sole
1061952 DRAFT, supra note 104, § 9-306 comment 2(c) (emphasis added).
107See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 4, 7, 7A U.L.A. 509
(1985) [hereinafter UFCA]. Provided that the transfer is made with fraudulent
intent, the creditor can have the conveyance avoided, or can disregard the
conveyance and levy on the property in the transferee's hands. See generally T.
CRANDALL, R. HAGEDORN & F. SMITH, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW MANUAL
6.07(2)(b) (1985) [hereinafter DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW]; I G. GLENN,
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 62 (rev. ed. 1940); Jackson,
Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 777-86 (1984).
t08See A.L.I. & NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1957 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS § 9-
306 comment 2(c) (1958) [hereinafter 1957 TEXT]. The 1957 Text provided a
general rule that "[elxcept where this Article otherwise provides, a security
interest . . . continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received
by the debtor." Id. § 9-306(2). Its mouse ancestor provided that:
In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a debtor, a
secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds has a perfected
security interest ... in all cash and bank accounts of the debtor, if other cash
proceeds have been commingled or deposited in a bank account, but the
perfected security interest under this paragraph ... is ... limited to an
amount not greater than the amount of any cash proceeds received by the debtor
within ten days before the institution of the insolvency proceedings and
commingled or deposited in a bank account prior to the insolvency
proceedings ....
Id. § 9-306(4)(d)(ii).
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content of Comment Two (c) to the 1957 Text's section 9-306.109 The 1957
Text did not affect a secured party's right to recover transferred cash
proceeds. 1 10 Work on the mouse was substantially complete with the
promulgation of the 1957 Text. The 1957 version of section 9-306 was in
effect until that section was officially amended to its current form in
1972.111 The 1972 amendments did not affect the right to identify funds
The secured party's recovery was subject to any right of set-off and reduced by
cash proceeds paid over during the ten day period. Id. § 9-306(4)(d)(i), (ii).
Comments indicated that this language provided a security interest in the
debtor's cash and bank accounts without the need to trace and changed existing
law, i.e., the UTRA. See id. § 9-306 comment 2(c); supra note 95 and
accompanying text. Comment two (b) dealt with the problem of voidable
preferences in bankruptcy and the perfection of security interests in proceeds. See
id. § 9-306 comment 2(b). The 1957 Text's § 9-306 represents a general rewrite
to enhance clarity. See A.L.I. & NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter
1956 RECOMMENDATIONS] § 9-306 (reason for change) (1957). The mouse
ancestor was rewritten:
to permit the retention of the security interest in identifiable cash proceeds, and
to give a security interest in all unidentifiable cash and bank accounts received
by the debtor but limited to the net amount of cash proceeds received and
retained by the debtor within ten days prior to insolvency proceedings.
See id. 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS § 9-306 is identical to 1957 TEXT § 9-306.
Compare id. § 9-306 with 1957 TEXT § 9-306. The 1957 TEXT'S § 9-306 was the
first to be widely enacted. See A.L.I. & NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS AT VII-VIII
(1962) [hereinafter 1962 TEXT].
109See 1957 TEXT, supra note 108, § 9-306 comment 2(c).
it °See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
11 See 1962 TEXT, supra note 108, at § 9-306. Comments 2(a) and 2(c) to § 9-
306 of this text also were identical to those contained in the 1957 Text. See id. § 9-
306 comments 2(a), (c). The 1962 Text remained the official text until 1972. See
A.L.I. & NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1972
OFFICIAL TEXT AND COMMENTS OF ARTICLE 9 SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND
CONFORMING AMENDMENTS TO RELATED SECTIONS WITH SUPPLEMENTARY
TEXT SHOWING ADDITIONS AND DELETIONS AND STATEMENT OF REASONS
FOR CHANGES MADE § 9-306 (1972) [hereinafter 1972 AMENDMENTS]. The
statutory language in this version of § 9-306 is identical to that contained in the
1978 Official Text, see supra note 10 and accompanying text. See also A.L.I. &
NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, ARTICLE 2A. LEASES
(WITH CONFORMING AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLES 1 AND 9) PROPOSED FINAL
DRAFT 187-88 (1987) (adopted without alteration to the 1978 Official Text).
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transferred prior to bankruptcy. 112 The language of the Comment Two (c)
appearing with the 1957 Text is identical to that of Comment Two (c) in
the current Code ("Comment Two (c)").
1 13
C. Priority and Relief According to Comment Two (c)
The recovery right described in Comment Two (c) belongs to a
secured party and the property recovered is designated as proceeds.
Hence, its authors were speaking of recovering property subject to a
security interest, not unsecured claims. 114 Juxtaposition of the law of
fraudulent conveyances with the law of secured claims initially may seem
puzzling. Fraudulent conveyance doctrine ordinarily is invoked by
general creditors lacking security interests in debtors' assets. A secured
creditor would seem to be less concerned with fraudulent transfers of
collateral because third parties generally take subject to security
interests. 115 Actually, this juxtaposition reveals much about Comment
112The official reason for these amendments indicates that "[tihe revised
subsection (4) is a clarification based on the California revision. It makes clear
that the claim to cash allowed in insolvency is exclusive of any other claim based
on tracing." 1972 AMENDMENTS, supra note 111, at 214. The California
language was adopted because it clarified drafting imperfections in the 1962 Text
unrelated to transferred cash proceeds. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, FINAL REPORT 221 (1971); Skilton, supra
note 1, at 67-70, 75-77. See generally Funk, The Proposed Revision of Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 26 BUS. LAW. 1465, 1481-82 (1971); Hawkland, The
Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the UCC Part II Proceeds, 77 COM. L.J. 12, 19-20
(1972); Henson, Some "Proceeds" and Priority Problems Under Revised Article 9, 12
WM. & MARY L. REV. 750, 756 (1971).
113See U.C.C. § 9-306 comment 2(c) (1977). Comment 2(a) indicates that
§ 9-306(4)(d) applies to a bankrupt debtor's cash and deposit accounts. See id.
§ 9-306 comment 2(a). Comment 2(b) addresses the bankruptcy preference
problem and perfection of secured claims to proceeds. See id. § 9-306 comment
2(b).
114Article Nine defines collateral as "property subject to a security interest,"
which includes proceeds. 1952 DRAFT, supra note 104, at §§ 9-105(1)(c), 9-
306(1); 1957 TEXT, supra note 108, at §§ 9-105(1)(c), 9-306(1); U.C.C. §§ 9-
105(c), 9-306(1) (1977).
11 5ee, e.g., Gaskin v. Smith, 375 Ill. 59, 30 N.E.2d 624 (1940); Lett v.
West, 195 Okl. 472, 158 P.2d 1010 (1945). But see Shiveley's Adm's v. Jones, 45
Ky. 274 (1845). Secured creditors may have the right to have set aside fraudulent
transfers of noncollateral. However, the presence of security can limit this right
(e.g., the creditor may have to demonstrate that the collateral was insufficient).
See Glenn, Creditors' Rights-A Review of Recent Developments, 32 VA. L. REV. 235,
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Two (c)'s vision of secured rights to commingled funds.1 1 6
Fraudulent conveyance law was cited for several reasons. One reason
was to identify the class of transferees not subject to security interests in
cash proceeds. Fraudulent conveyance doctrine shares a concern
expressed in Comment Two (c) and elsewhere in the Code-protection of
good faith purchasers. 117 Comment Two (c) is specifically concerned with
checks and money.118 The Code provides negotiability rules protecting
holders in due course of checks. 119 The law of fraudulent conveyances
contains doctrine protecting good faith purchasers of instruments. 120 The
244 (1946); Annotation, Right of Secured Creditor to Have Set Aside Fraudulent Transfer
of Other Property By His Debtor, 8 A.L.R.4th 1123 (1981). Much of the case law
involves claims of fraudulent transfer made by real property mortgagees. The
situation of an Article Nine secured party claiming cash proceeds generally may
be more precarious. See infra notes 132, 140-53 and accompanying text.
.. 6 Comment 2(c)'s authors confidently asserted that "no doubt" cash
proceeds can be recovered in an appropriate case. See 1952 DRAFT, supra note
104, § 9-306 comment 2(c). In fact, it may have required a leap of faith to
conclude that a security interest in cash proceeds survived commingling. See 2 G.
GILMORE, supra note 4, at 735-36, 1338. However, there was precedent for the
use of commingled fund tracing in the context of pre-Code trust receipt
financing. See supra note 95. More recently, many courts have upheld the use of
tracing techniques to identify proceeds commingled in a bank account. See
generally Skilton, supra note 1, at 144-52. A somewhat cryptic reference to the law
of fraudulent conveyances may seem a poor substitute for more detailed
explication. However, it is consistent with Article Nine's general policy of
leaving the details of judicial remedies to extra-Code law. See 1952 DRAFT, supra
note 104, at § 9-501(1); 1957 TEXT, supra note 108, at § 9-501(1); U.C.C. § 9-
501(1) (1977). Brevity also was appropriate given the drafter's charge of
straightening up the muddle of pre-Code personal property security law, a task
considered more demanding than cleaning the Augean stables. Everett, Securing
Security, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 49 (1951). Commingled funds were far
from the only proceeds related issue faced by the draftsmen. See generally Kripke,
Inventory Financing of Hard Goods, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 580, 594-99.
117Grant Gilmore, who was an Associate Reporter and Reporter for Article
Nine, described the protection accorded to good faith purchasers as a
"triumph." Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J.
1057 (1954). See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at x-xii. The protection of good
faith purchasers facilitates the movement of property to comparatively high
valuing users. See Carlson, Rationality, Accident and Priority Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 71 MINN. L. REV. 207, 216-17 (1986).
1181952 DRAFT, supra note 104, at § 9-306(3); 1957 TEXT, supra note 108, at
§ 9-306(1).
1191952 DRAFT, supra note 104, at §§ 3-302(1), 3-305(1), 9-309; 1957 TEXT,
supra note 108, at §§ 3-302(1), 3-305(1), 9-309; U.C.C. §§ 3-302(1), 3-305(1), 9-
309 (1977).
120See 1 GLENN, supra note 107, at §§ 235-37.
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two bodies of law are approximately congruent, undoubtedly because of
commercial paper's historic role as a money substitute. 12 1 Likewise, it
may be possible to recover a fraudulent conveyance of money, but not
from a good faith purchaser.122
Comment Two (c)'s reference to the law of fraudulent conveyances
also provides guidance for the recovery of commingled funds. The
commentary likely was written in contemplation of a secured party's
rights to reduce its claim to judgment and to foreclose its security interest
by any available judicial procedure. 123 A wide range of judicial remedies
121For example, under both, creditors give value if they receive instruments
in payment of antecedent claims. See 1952 DRAFT, supra note 104, at § 3-303(b);
1957 TEXT, supra note 108, at § 3-303(b); U.C.C. § 3-303(b) (1977); 1 GLENN,
supra note 107, at §§ 289-289a. Both bodies are suspicious of persons who acquire
instruments in bulk transactions. See 1952 DRAFT, supra, at § 3-302(3)(c); 1957
TEXT at § 3-302(3)(c); U.C.C. § 3-302(3)(c); 1 GLENN, supra, at § 309.
Money's negotiable status is ancient, which is why the Code reflects, but need
not provide, this attribute. See 1952 DRAFT, supra, at §§ 1-201(24), 2-105(1), 3-
103(1) comment 1, 9-102(1)(a), 9-306(3); U.C.C. §§ 1-201(24), 2-105(1), 3-
103(1), 3-103 comment 1, 9-102(1)(a), 9-306(1). See generally Weinberg,
Commercial Paper in Economic Theory and Legal History, 70 KY. L.J. 567 (1981-82).
i22See Corbett v. Hunter, 292 Pa. Super. 123, 436 A.2d 1036 (1981); 1
GLENN, supra note 107, at §§ 138-39, 149(a), 235-37.
123See 1952 DRAFT, supra note 104, at § 9-501(1)(a). This draft's foreclosure
right expressly applied to goods, but apparently could be invoked for other types
of collateral. See id. § 9-501(3). Subsequent versions of the Code placed no limits
on the types of collateral subject to foreclosure by judicial procedure and stated
that the secured party's remedies were cumulative. Later versions also specified
that the lien of any levy made upon collateral by virtue of an execution based
upon a secured party's judgment relates back to the date of perfection of the
security interest. See 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 108, at § 9-501(1),
(5); U.C.C. § 9-501(1), (5) (1977). This rule should be applied to judicial liens
that arise from attachments or garnishments. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at
1209 n.6. In general, a judicial lien obtained by a prejudgment attachment or
garnishment is provisional. It becomes final when a judgment is obtained.
Interests obtained by third parties during the provisional period are subject to the
judgment creditor's rights. See generally DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra note 107,
at ?6.04(1)(0, (2)(e).
It is unlikely that Comment Two (c) contemplated the right to repossess by
self-help or by action. 1952 DRAFT, supra, at § 9-503; 1957 TEXT, supra note 108,
at § 9-503; U.C.C. § 9-503. Successful self-help repossession of transferred funds
is improbable. The transferee almost certainly would be unwilling to turn them
over voluntarily, and stealthy, yet legal, means to identify and possess funds in a
bank account or safe deposit box are lacking. In employing self-help, the secured
party is not permitted to breach the peace. See id. Obtaining funds from the
transferee's account by means of a forged check or breaking into a safe deposit
box are unlikely to meet this requirement and, in any event, seem unwise. See
DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra, at 7.05(6)(c)(ii). Actions to gain possession
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were provided by extra-Code law including attachment, garnishment,
and creditor's bills in equity.124 Comment Two (c) employed the law of
fraudulent conveyances as a shorthand for this array of remedies, and
particularly for relief obtainable without a judgment. Summary relief
against fraudulent conveyances was possible by the time of Comment Two
(c)'s adoption. Nonjudgment creditors had a right to equitable relief both
under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act and nonuniform
fraudulent transfer statutes. 125 Prejudgment remedies of attachment or
prior to foreclosure, such as replevin, are generally limited to recovering chattels.
Replevin may be appropriate for the recovery of money only in situations in
which bills or coins are specifically identifiable by virtue of being physically
labeled or segregated. See id. at § 6.04(3)(b).
After default, a secured creditor is also entitled to notify an account debtor to
make payment to the secured creditor and to take control of any proceeds to
which it is entitled under § 9-306. See 1952 DRAFT, supra, at § 9-502(1); U.C.C.
§ 9-502(1). The account debtor is the person who owes a money claim to the
debtor such as the obligor on an account receivable. See 1952 DRAFT, supra, at
§ 9-105(1)(a); U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(a). A bank in which the debtor maintains a
deposit account might conceivably fall under this definition. See generally U.C.C.
§ 4-401; supra note 18. However, this remedy was considered primarily as a
vehicle for recovering on noncash proceeds generated by a debtor's sale of
inventory (e.g., accounts or chattel paper), not cash proceeds. See generally 2 G.
GILMORE, supra, at 1231-32. Furthermore, by 1956 deposit accounts were
excluded as original collateral from the scope of Article Nine. See 1956
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra, at § 9-104(k).
124For example, a secured party should be permitted to employ prejudgment
garnishment against a bank account containing cash proceeds if it has grounds
under the garnishment statute and can trace into the account. Ex parte Alabama
Mobile Homes, Inc. (Re ITT Diversified Credit Corp v. Alabama Mobile
Homes, Inc.), 468 So.2d 156 (Ala. 1985). See generally A.L.I. & NAT'L CONF. OF
COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1958 SUPPLEMENT TO THE 1957
OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-
501(1) (1958); 9 W. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 9-
501:05 (1986). Details of the specific remedies available are a function of the
jurisdiction in which relief is sought and the facts of the case. The law is not
uniform. See DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra note 107, at ch. 6. Concerning the
application of these remedies to cash proceeds (cash, checks, and bank accounts),
see id. at 6.04(1)(e), (2)(d); S. RIESENFELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 163, 166-67 (4th ed.
1987).
125At one time, a judgment generally was necessary to obtain relief against a
fraudulent conveyance. But this requirement was eliminated by the UFCA and
other statutory and common law developments. See S. RIESENFELD, supra note
124, at 274-75; 1 G. GLENN, supra note 106, at §§ 76, 79, 84-85. The UFCA
(like the U.C.C., a product of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws) was approved in 1918 and had been enacted in 19
jurisdictions by the promulgation of the 1952 Draft. See UFCA, supra note 107, at
427. These included important commercial states such as Massachusetts, New
York, and Pennsylvania. Id.
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garnishment also were available in many states.
126 Rules of joinder
permitted plaintiffs' claims to set aside fraudulent conveyances without
first obtaining a judgment establishing a money claim.
127 All these
developments were intended to avoid delay, which was essential for a
secured party pursuing transferred cash proceeds.
12 8
Relief suggested by Comment Two (c) also includes restitutionary
relief by way of equitable liens or constructive trusts. The Comment's
predecessors stated that non good faith purchasers held cash proceeds as
trustees. 12 9 Case law provided that a fraudulent transferee becomes a
trustee for creditors of the transferor,
130 a view reflected in the
Restatement of Restitution. 13 1 On Comment Two (c)'s authority,
restitution has been successfully employed to recover cash proceeds
commingled in a bank account.
13 2
D. Restitution and Article Nine
This article has considered two instances in which restitution plays an
important role within the framework of Article Nine. The LIBR and
related tracing principles are employed to identify commingled funds
subject to a security interest, 13 3 and restitution provides judicial remedies
for enforcing secured claims. 1 3
4 It was reasonable to conclude in each case
126See DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra note 107, at 6.04(1)(d), (2)(c); 1
G. GLENN, supra note 107, at § 80.
127This was provided for in the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which changed prior law and became effective in 1938. FED. R. CIV. P. 18(b).
See S. RIESENFELD, supra note 124, at 275; 1 G. GLENN, supra note 107, at § 78,
131.
128See generally 1 G. GLENN, supra note 107, § 83, 142.
129See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
130See, e.g., Doherty v. Holiday, 137 Ind. 282, 32 N.E. 315 (1892).
131RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 7, at § 168(2) comment c.
132See supra note 43 and accompanying text. Two factors generally should
weigh in favor of a secured creditor's judicial recovery of commingled cash
proceeds. First, the recovery is sought against assets subject to a security interest,
not general assets. Second, the creditor's secured status probably is precarious.
Enforcing a security interest in cash proceeds usually is likely to be attractive only
if other collateral is insufficient to secure the debt, or is unreachable because of a
priority rule. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-307(1). The security interest is further
jeopardized because cash proceeds are negotiable. See infra notes 140-53 and
accompanying text.
133See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
1 34 See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
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that restitution provides supplemental principles of law not displaced by
Article Nine. 135 Article Nine requires a secured party to identify
proceeds-except in cases subject to the malformed mouse-but does not
specify how this task is accomplished, opening the door to restitutionary
tracing.136 Article Nine specifies that extra-Code judicial remedies are
available to secured creditors. 13 7 Article Nine also sets parameters for the
application of restitutionary remedies. A wrongful act generally is
requisite to restitutionary relief. 138 In the context of secured financing,
this requirement should be assimilated to the Article Nine principle that a
security interest continues on transferred collateral unless the secured
party authorized its disposition.1 39 In each of these three instances,
Article Nine was consulted first because it provides the validating
framework for personal property security. Restitution was supplemental.
This approach also is appropriate when a secured party seeks
restitutionary relief against cash proceeds or their product in a
transferee's possession. Comment Two (c) provides little guidance
concerning the priority of transferees, which may have caused Datair to
erroneously suggest that section 9-306(4)(d) controls priority. 140 Section
9-306 does have priority determinative content, but it does not resolve
these cases. 1 41 To understand the priority structure of Article Nine and its
135 Article Nine provides many opportunities for the application of
restitution. See Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 906, 919-26 (1978).
136U.C.C. §§ 1-103, 9-306(2) (1977).
13 7Id. § 9-501(1).
138 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
139See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
140See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
1 4 1
U.C.C. § 9-306 provides that a security interest continues in transferred
collateral (including identifiable proceeds) unless the secured party authorized
the transfer. See id. § 9-105(1)(c). This language effectively creates a priority rule.
See id. § 9-306(2) comment 3; Hedrick Savings Bank v. Myers, 229 N.W.2d 252
(Iowa 1975). Section 9-306 also contains a priority rule applicable to returned or
repossessed goods and subordinates a secured party's recovery under § 9-
306(4)(d) to rightful bank set-offs. See U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(5). However, the
section generally is concerned with nonpriority matters, and is devoid of Article
Nine's usual priority rule phraseology such as "is subordinate to," "has priority
in," or "takes subject to." See, e.g., id. §§ 9-301(1); 9-312(3). This reflects a
decision to place in other Code sections general priority rules for both proceeds
and original collateral. See supra note 99. But see, e.g., id. § 9-308(b) (chattel paper
claimed merely as proceeds of inventory).
The priority-determinative content of U.C.C. § 9-306 was at issue under the
1962 Official Text's § 9-312, which lists Article Nine priority rules, and refers to
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relationship to restitution, consider an example in which secured party
("SP") seeks recovery of commingled but identifiable cash proceeds
transferred by the debtor to A, which A deposited in a checking account
used to purchase inventory. B, a creditor of A, also claims the account and
inventory.
The first step is to determine whether SP's rights are superior or
subordinate to A's. Under Article Nine, security interests are valid against
third parties unless the Code provides to the contrary.
14 2 The Code's
priority rules are not limited to those fully explicated in Article 
Nine. 143
Other Code articles provide priority rules, as does undisplaced extra-
Code law.14 4 Thus, the priority of a secured party claiming cash proceeds
might be governed by Article Three rules protecting holders in due course
or extra-Code restitutionary rules protecting good faith transferees of
money. 14 5 The importance of negotiability for cash and cash
"[slection 9-306 on proceeds, and repossessions." 1962 TEXT, supra note 108, at
§ 9-312(1). Debate centered on whether this text's § 9-312(5)(a) (priority
governed by order of filing) or its § 9-306(3) ("the security interest in proceeds is
a continuously perfected security interest") governed certain priority contests
between inventory and receivables financers. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 4,
§ 29.4, at 791; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 908-09, 921 (1st ed. 1972). The 1972
Amendments to Article Nine replaced the priority rule reference in § 9-312 with
a general reference to priority rules "stated in other sections of this Part." 1972
AMENDMENTS, supra note 111, at § 9-312(1). See U.C.C. § 9-312(1). The change
was primarily for simplification. 1972 AMENDMENTS, supra note 111, at 220. But
it also may have been intended to prevent the implication of a priority rule in
1972 Amendments § 9-306(3). See 1972 AMENDMENTS, supra note 111, at § 9-
312(3),(5),(6). See U.C.C. §§ 9-312(3),(5),(6). See generally WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 8, at 1040-41.
142See U.C.C. § 9-201 (1977) ("Except as otherwise provided by this Act a
security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against
purchasers of the collateral and against creditors"); Id. § 1-101 ("This Act shall
be known and may be cited as the Uniform Commercial Code.").
i43See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
144See U.C.C. § 1-103.
45Transferees of checks may be protected by U.C.C. Articles Three and
Four. See U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-305, 4-209. Holder in due course standing does not
directly control when a check is drawn on an account containing proceeds. It
provides protection against claims to the instrument, not to the contents of the
account against which the check is drawn. Id. § 3-305. However, holder in due
course status should be very persuasive in demonstrating that a check transferee
cuts off claims to the commingled funds. A transferee's holder in due course
standing is controlling if the debtor receives a check representing proceeds, for
example, a payment from a purchaser of inventory collateral-which it
subsequently negotiates to the transferee. See id. § 3-202(1). See generally Skilton,
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equivalents dictates the general congruency of these Code and non-Code
rules, but the Code's fully explicated priority rules are primary and extra-
Code law is supplementary. 146 Ultimately, A's priority will turn on a fact-
sensitive inquiry into whether the transfer from the debtor to A was
tainted by bad faith, A's knowledge of fraud by the debtor, and so forth.
Martin and Datair each present examples of facts likely to subordinate a
transferee to a secured claim.
147
supra note 1, at 144-52. Extra-Code principles may protect good faith transferees
of cash. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 7, at §§ 172, 204.
See generally R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 9.5 (3d ed. 1975).
146The example in the text involves a secured party employing restitution to
vindicate a security interest. Department of Natural Resources v. Benjamin, 41
Colo. App. 520, 587 P.2d 1207 (1978) illustrates how Article Nine and
restitutionary priority rules may reach consistent results when restitutionary
rights are asserted against a secured party. A merchant wrongfully purchased
inventory with proceeds from the sale of Colorado game and fishing licenses. The
state instituted prejudgment attachment proceedings against the store's
inventory, claiming that it was subject to a constructive trust. A bank claiming a
perfected security interest in the inventory intervened. The court looked to
Article Nine's priority rules, which favored the bank because the security interest
was perfected before the state obtained a lien pursuant to the attachment. (The
court erroneously cited section 9-312(5) as outcome-determinative; the correct
priority rule would have been § 9-301(l)(b). See Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516
S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1974)). The court also determined that restitutionary doctrine
permitted the bank as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a prior
claim to cut off the state's restitutionary rights. But see Oesterle, supra note 2, at
192-94. On a more general level, reasoning under Article Nine in this sort of case
might proceed as follows. A debtor who owns property subject only to an
outstanding restitutionary claim has sufficient rights for a security interest to
attach. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c); Id. § 1-103. See generally R. HILLMAN, J.
MCDONNELL, & S. NICKLES, supra note 37, at ch. 18. The debtor's rights may
be characterized by extra-Code restitutionary doctrine as a legal title. See infra
notes 191-95 and accompanying text. A person armed with a restitutionary
claim, but lacking a lien obtained by judicial proceedings, is not a lien creditor.
See U.C.C. § 9-301(3). Rather, it is general creditor and its rights are
subordinate to an unperfected security interest until a judicial lien is obtained. See
U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-301. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION,
supra note 37, at § 43 comments a, d. In some instances a secured party may also
be protected by Article Nine purchaser-protective priority rules. See infra note 153
and accompanying text.
147See supra notes 77-91 and accompanying text. Negotiability generally may
require that a transferee of cash or cash equivalents have priority even if the
security interest is perfected by filing, the transferee knew that the deposit
account from which payment was made contained proceeds, and the value given
by the transferee consisted of an antecedent debt. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(44), 9-
308, 9-309. Cf id. § 9-307(1). That the transfer was in the ordinary course of the
transferor's business may support a transferee's priority. See id. § 9-306 comment
2(c). See generally McDonnell, Freedom from Claims and Defenses: A Study in Judicial
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As a result of the rights asserted by B, a second step is necessary to
complete the analysis. The starting premise is that B's rights are
derivative of A's. 148 B is subject to SP's secured claim if A was subject to
the claim. However, it is possible for B to obtain better rights than A
because of the operation of a priority rule. Priority protection for B will be
dependent upon the nature of its claim.
149 Recalling that A used funds
from the checking account to purchase inventory, suppose that B's claim
to the inventory is based upon an after-acquired property clause in a
security agreement with A.
150 The dispute is between SP, who claims the
inventory as proceeds of the cash proceeds contained in A's checking
account, and B, who claims the inventory under the after-acquired
property clause. 15 ' The priority provisions for contests between two
secured parties contemplate the typical case, not present here, in which
both interests are claimed through a common debtor. 152 However, under
Activism Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 GA. L. REV. 569, 600-03 (1983).
But see Zubrow, supra note 60, at 957 n.226. The circumstances of the transfer
must always be evaluated in light of the specific requirements of the applicable
priority rule. See infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
148See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-403(1); 3-201(1).
149For example, extra-Code rules may pertain to banks that acquire funds by
exercising set-off rights. See id. § 9-104(i). See generally Rauer, Conflicts Between Set-
Offs andArticle Nine Security Interests, 39 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1986). A lien creditor
garnishing a bank account should be subject to a perfected security interest to the
extent that the account contains identifiable proceeds. See supra note 146.
15°See U.C.C. §§ 9-102(1), 9-109(4), 9-204(1).
5 1B might claim the checking account as original collateral pursuant to a
security agreement with A. This security interest is not within Article Nine's
scope, but SP's proceeds claim to the account is. See U.C.C. § 9-104(1). The
article has no priority rule governing this case. See Zubrow, supra note 60, at 899.
152See generally Skilton, Security Interests in After-Acquired Property Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 925, 948. A case might arise in
which the usual priority rules for competing secured claimants do apply. Suppose
that A finances the debtor's T.V. inventory, and B finances the debtor's V.C.R.
inventory. Each creditor has an enforceable security interest in their respective
original collateral and all proceeds, and A filed first. Debtor sells all the T.V.s
and V.C.R.s and commingles all the proceeds in a deposit account. The size of
A's security interest against the deposit account should be determined by
applying the LIBR, while ignoring B's security interest, and vice versa. See
Zubrow, supra note 60, at 969-72. A probably has priority because it filed before
B, see U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a),(6) (1977), although the conclusion must be hedged
because the two creditors arguably share pro rata if purchase money security
interests are involved. See id. §§ 9-107, 9-312(3). Cf id. § 9-315. But see John
Deere Co. v. Production Credit Ass'n, 686 S.W.2d 904 (Tenn. App. 1984)
(refusing to prorate). The restitutionary rule for commingled money of several
persons may support this result although, as indicated supra at notes 132-36 and
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Article Nine it is proper to label B a purchaser and apply priority rules
that protect purchasers to determine B's priority against SP.153
IV. ENTITLEMENTS AND CREDIT COST
Section 9-306(4)(d) and restitutionary tracing, including the LIBR,
each provide an entitlement to commingled funds containing proceeds
and nonproceeds. Which of these entitlements is preferable given the
opportunity to choose de novo and amend Article Nine to implement the
choice?' 54 This part of the article assumes that the superior entitlement
reduces aggregate credit costs to a greater extent. 155 Justification for
having any entitlement at all is considered first. Sources of credit cost
relevant to an entitlement are then analyzed. One source of credit cost is
the risk that the entitlement may be avoided in bankruptcy. Another cost
is the risk of conversion by commingling. Lastly, these costs are
considered in determining whether the mouse or restitutionary tracing
more closely approaches optimality.
A. Why Any Entitlement?
A security interest is a specialized property right created by
agreement and regulated by Article Nine. What the security interest is
accompanying text, its role is supplemental. See RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION, supra note 7, at § 213. The usual priority rules for contests
between secured parties contemplate security interests in the same collateral,
which occurred upon commingling of the proceeds in the deposit account. See
U.C.C. §§ 9-105(1)(c), 9-306(2).
153The U.C.C. defines "purchaser" as a person who takes through a
voluntary transaction creating an interest in property. See U.C.C. § 1-201(32),
(33). Whether a secured party has priority qua purchaser presents issues of law
and fact, which are beyond the scope of this article. Guidance is obtainable from
other sources. See Mattson v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, 301 Or. 407,
723 P.2d 996 (1986). See generally McDonnell, The Floating Lienor as Good Faith
Purchaser, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 429 (1977).
154The inquiry is limited to changing state law, and does not consider
amending the Bankruptcy Code to provide a federal statutory entitlement.
'5"Minimizing credit costs provides an important theoretical justification for
validating consensual secured credit. See generally White, Efficiency Justifications for
Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1984).
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enforceable in or has priority to is not specified in Article Nine. 15 6 Article
Nine requires that the collateral be described in the security agreement so
that it can be distinguished at reasonable cost from noncollateral.
157
Making this distinction is impossible after funds subject to a security
interest are commingled with other funds. Therefore, the law must either
provide some entitlement or terminate the creditor's secured status with
respect to the funds. Whether the law should provide an entitlement is
part of the broader question of whether the law should afford favorable
treatment to secured as opposed to unsecured creditors.
The reduction of aggregate credit costs is an important justification
for the legal validation of consensual nonpossessory security interests with
priority over many third parties. t 58 It is theorized that subordinate
creditors either are not harmed by or are compensated for the secured
party's priority in the event of bankruptcy. 15 9 For example, relational
financing theory views security as a contractual mechanism for providing
a secured party with leverage to influence the debtor in order to maximize
the debtor's and secured creditor's joint returns from the financed
enterprise.160 A legally enforceable floating lien and strong rights upon
default enable the creditor to reduce the risk of debtor misconduct
interfering with this goal. Debtors agree to security in return for financial
services provided by the creditor. They also agree to security because
leverage provided by the floating lien is more cost-effective than other
means for protecting the secured party's interests. Unsecured creditors
benefit from these services and are relieved of certain expenses which they
would incur in the absence of a relational secured financer. 
161
An entitlement to cash proceeds arising upon commingling
functionally is part of a floating lien, and shares some of the same
156See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-203(1)(a), 9-312 (1977) (the Article Nine statute of
frauds and the rules governing priorities among conflicting security interests in
the same collateral, respectively).
157See U.C.C. §§ 9-203(t)(a), 9-110.
15 8See generally Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L.
REV. 1051 (1984); White, supra note 155. Cost reduction and the facilitation of
security arrangements allowing the debtor to have access to collateral are
important Article Nine policies. See U.C.C. §§ 9-101 comment; 9-205.
159See generally Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979).
160See generally Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 901, 924 (1986).
161See id. at 925.
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justifications.16 2 Cash proceeds are collateral consisting of cash flow
generated by the debtor's disposition of original collateral such as
inventory and accounts. 16 3 A secured party is likely to perceive
commingling of cash proceeds as a risk because it renders the proceeds
physically indistinguishable from noncollateral. Commingling makes it
more difficult for the secured party to monitor or take possession of cash
proceeds, and makes it easier for the debtor to extinguish the security
interest in the proceeds by unauthorized transfer. 164 Lending against cash
flow is less risky under a legal regime that provides an entitlement to
commingled cash proceeds as compared to a regime that does not. An
entitlement increases the secured party's probability of recovery in the
event of commingling and provides a substitute for reducing the
commingling risk by monitoring the debtor. The entitlement's definition
determines just how close a substitute it is. 165 Section 9-306(4)(d) and
identification by restitutionary tracing are but two examples of how
Article Nine facilitates financing against cash flow. Other examples
include: (1) the right to perfect a security interest in cash proceeds by
filing, even though filing is inappropriate for money, checks, or bank
accounts as original collateral; 16 6 and (2) the purchase money priority in
inventory, which carries through only to cash proceeds.
16 7
Valuable insight into secured credit and a rationale for entitlements to
commingled cash proceeds is also provided by monitoring theory. 168 Bank
162The floating lien's priority is an essential incentive for relational
financers. Without it, other persons with interests in the financed firm would
harvest the benefits derived from the secured financer's inputs. See id. at 961. See
generally I G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 359-60.
163See supra notes 19-33 and accompanying text.
164See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
16 5Goods that perform similar functions are substitutes. A "close" substitute
does a better job of performing the function than a "weak" substitute. See
generally THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 391 (1972).
166See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
167See U.C.C. § 9-312(3).
168See Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92
YALE L.J. 49, 55-59 (1982). The importance of monitoring is not merely
theoretic. Professor Kripke has written that -[t]he greatest risk is that as the
debtor's financial position weakens, collections will be diverted to other business
needs or even to personal needs. [Accounts receivable] . . . financing
necessitates that the lender maintain an internal crew of field auditors to review
the borrower's books periodically . . . . [O]nly a security interest . . . puts the
lender in a position to monitor effectively." Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring
the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
929, 951 (1985). He argues that a higher interest rate cannot compensate for
these risks. Id. at 950.
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accounts, inventory, and other commercial assets can serve as specific
focal points for monitoring debtor misconduct. A security interest with
priority in certain assets provides an incentive for efficient monitors to
extend credit secured by these assets and to charge an interest rate that is
lower than it would be in the absence of security. 169 Filing provides notice
of the priority to other creditors who cannot free ride on the monitor's
efforts because they lack priority in the focal point assets. The monitor's
notice filing reduces wasteful duplicative monitoring efforts by other
creditors. 170
An entitlement to commingled cash proceeds can be viewed as part of
the incentive to monitor. It provides both a carrot and a stick. Perfect
monitoring, which prevents all commingling of cash proceeds by the
debtor, often will be too costly to be efficient. Accordingly, some cash
proceeds may be lost despite optimal monitoring. 171 The entitlement
assures a secured party who undertakes monitoring that all secured status
will not necessarily be lost in the event that monitoring fails. This is the
carrot that helps motivate the creditor to lend at a favorable rate. The
stick is the situation that occurs when the creditor proves to be unsecured
because the creditor's recovery under the entitlement is zero. An
entitlement to commingled cash proceeds represents a legislative effort to
strike a balance between encouraging secured credit without creating a
hazard that secured parties with priority will provide insufficient
monitoring. t 72 However the balance is struck, a public filing covering
proceeds as well as original collateral provides notice of the entitlement to
other creditors who can adjust their conduct accordingly.
173
169But see supra note 168.
170Banks and other asset-based lenders may be more efficient monitors
because they enjoy economies of scale and have invested in special expertise. See
Levmore, supra note 168, at 56-57.
171See infra notes 213-19 and accompanying text.
172An entitlement might be viewed as a form of insurance. Many business
risks are uninsurable or only partially insurable because insurance would create a
disincentive to avoid loss, i.e., a moral hazard. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 150, 376-77 (3d ed. 1986).
173See generally Levmore, supra note 168, at 57-59. Security interests in
proceeds are assumed by Article Nine because they are so fundamental to the
secured party's security and are almost universally claimed. See U.C.C. §§ 9-
203(3), 9-402(3). The dimensions of the entitlement are defined by the law, not
the security agreement. Therefore, third parties have notice of its existence and
general scope, but may lack information needed to define its value at any given
time. See infra notes 230-38 and accompanying text.
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B. The Risk of Avoidance by the Trustee
If some entitlement to commingled cash proceeds is justified, then
how should the entitlement be defined? The definitions provided by
section 9-306(4)(d) and restitutionary tracing are creatures of state law. It
makes little sense to consider them as alternatives if one is significantly
more vulnerable to challenge by federal bankruptcy trustees.
1. The Mouse
Section 9-306(4)(d) has been held to create a voidable preference in
bankruptcy. 174 Broad consideration of the mouse's preference and other
bankruptcy problems is not undertaken here because the literature
dealing with these problems is already extensive. 175 However, a few points
concerning the mouse bear mentioning either because they have not been
recognized, or have been given insufficient attention.
First, there is no way to physically demonstrate that any unit of value
in a commingled bank account has an attached security interest.
Therefore, any recovery from commingled funds must depend upon an
entitlement. 176 Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code mandates that funds
become property of the debtor's estate just because they cannot be
physically segregated as collateral subject to a security interest. To the
contrary, courts have honored tracing-based unsecured claims to
commingled funds in bankruptcy. 17 7 Courts also seem willing to entertain
properly substantiated secured claims in bankruptcy under section 9-
306(4)(d).
178
Second, neither the mouse nor identification by restitutionary tracing
is systematically biased in favor of or against secured creditors. 179 Under
174Arizona Wholesale Supply Co. v. Itule (In re Gibson Products), 543 F.2d
652, 654 (9th Cir. 1976).
175See, e.g., R. HENSON, supra note 8, at § 6-7; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 8, at § 24-6; Skilton, supra note 1, at 80-91.
176See supra text accompanying note 157.
177See infra notes 191-97 and accompanying text.
'78See, e.g., Maxl Sales Co. v. Critiques, Inc., 796 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir.
1986); In re Jameson's Foods, Inc., 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1381
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1983); In re Dexter Buick-GMC Truck Co., 2 Bankr. 242
(Bankr. D.R.I. 1980); In re Guaranteed Muffler Supply Co., 27 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1217 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
'79Professor Gilmore assumed that the mouse generally provides less to
secured creditors in bankruptcy than they would receive from a solvent debtor.
See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 1337-40.
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Article Nine's asymmetric scheme of entitlements, a secured creditor's
recovery in bankruptcy under section 9-306(4)(d) almost always will be
different from what would be recovered absent bankruptcy procedures
where the secured party may identify proceeds by restitutionary tracing.
Differing recoveries is one consequence of asymmetry, and is independent
of the particular entitlements employed. It would occur, for example, even
if the mouse required actual commingling of proceeds with nonproceeds
during its ten day period.
The likelihood of different recoveries is not an indication of whether
secured creditors are better or worse off under section 9-306(4)(d) than
under restitutionary tracing. Consider the following example:
Day Deposit/Withdrawal Balance
1 + $1000 of proceeds $1000
3 - 900 100
5 + 1000 of nonproceeds 1,100
7 Debtor files for bankruptcy 1,100
The secured party recovers more under the mouse (one thousand dollars)
than under the LIBR (one hundred dollars).,
8 0 However, if all facts
remain the same except that the filing occurs on the eleventh day, the
secured party would do better under the LIBR (one hundred dollars) than
under the mouse (zero). 181 The amount recovered under the entitlements
is a function of the timing and size of receipts, deposits, and withdrawals;
the date of bankruptcy; and whether receipts or deposits consist of
proceeds or nonproceeds. Meaningful generalizations about these
variables seem unlikely. In addition there is no empirical evidence
concerning the occurrence of the variables. 182 Therefore, there is no
factual basis for concluding that either entitlement is systematically
biased.
180 See supra notes 41-72 and accompanying text.
18'See supra notes 41-72 and accompanying text.
182There is no empirical study concerning systematic bias of U.C.C. § 9-
306(4)(d) or restitutionary tracing. Bankruptcy reports considering secured
claims to commingled funds are unlikely to provide sufficient data for reliable
findings because they typically focus on claims under U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d), and
do not consider tracing except to indicate that it is preempted by the mouse in
bankruptcy. See, e.g., In rejameson's Foods, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1381 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1983). Secured creditors often come up empty-handed
under the mouse because of a lack of evidence that proceeds were received by the
debtor during the ten day period. See, e.g., In re Cooper, 2 Bankr. 188, 196
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980).
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The Bankruptcy Code may be interpreted to condemn section 9-
306(4)(d) because it sometimes awards a larger recovery than
restitutionary tracing. 183 However, neither the possibility nor the
actuality of a larger recovery should offend bankruptcy policy unless the
bankruptcy entitlement systematically awards more than the
nonbankruptcy entitlement-which is not the case-or the entitlements
can be manipulated by secured parties to this end-which seems
unlikely. 184
2. Restitutionary Tracing
Section 9-306(4)(d) and its ancestors precluded the development of
bankruptcy doctrine concerning the identification of security interests in
commingled funds by means of restitutionary tracing principles.1 85
Suppose that 9-306(4)(d) were repealed and Article Nine amended to
permit the use of restitution for this purpose. 186 Could the secured claim
withstand the trustee? An answer may lie in the possibility that
bankruptcy law permits an unsecured creditor to employ restitution to
recover funds from a bankruptcy estate. If this is possible, then a secured
183See supra text accompanying note 179. In the example, in which
bankruptcy is on the seventh day, the mouse permits the secured party to recover
$1,000 from a $1,100 account consisting of over 90 percent funds which were not
received from the disposition of collateral, i.e., nonproceeds. See U.C.C. § 9-
306(1); see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. Arguably, this results in a
transfer to the creditor on account of an antecedent debt during the Bankruptcy
Code's 90 day preference period to the extent that the secured party can recover
more under the mouse ($1,000) than under the LIBR ($100), or $900. See 11
U.S.C. § 547(b), (e) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY 552 (2d ed. 1987).
1 84See infra notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
'"Opinion was divided concerning the possibility of tracing commingled
cash proceeds in bankruptcy prior to enactment of U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d) or its
ancestors. See generally Gillombardo, The Treatment of Uniform Commercial Code
Proceeds in Bankruptcy: A Proposed Redraft of Section 9-306, 38 U. CINN. L. REV. 1,
8-11, 22-27 (1969).
18 6For example, repeal of U.C.C. § 9-306(4) should permit a secured party
to "identify" proceeds in bankruptcy pursuant to § 9-306(2) and extra-Code
restitutionary doctrine. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44. See generally
Gillombardo, supra note 185, at 30-31. A problem with this approach is that it
leaves the secured party's tracing right to nonuniform extra-Code law. It might
be desirable to define the term "identifiable" by codifying restitutionary tracing
principles.
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claim employing restitutionary tracing should be entitled to the usual
bankruptcy recognition of security interests
18 7 and would be subject to the
usual trustee avoidance techniques.
188
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that property in which
the debtor holds only legal title at the commencement of bankruptcy, and
not an equitable interest, is property of the bankruptcy estate only to the
extent of the debtor's legal title.
189 Legislative history indicates a
congressional intent to exclude from the estate property held by the
debtor, which is subject to a constructive trust. 190 Cases applying section
541 conclude that the estate stands in the debtor's shoes.
19 1 It may be
required to relinquish possession of an asset to the beneficial owner if it
holds only the legal portion of a bifurcated title. 
192 The state law relevant
to unjust enrichment and restitution controls whether there is an
equitable lien or a constructive trust on assets in the estate's possession. 
193
For example, a recent opinion of the Tenth Circuit held that state law
imposed a fiduciary relationship on the debtor, which bound him to
properly bill the plaintiff. 19 4 Negligent overbilling subjected funds in
t87See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363, 506 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See generally
B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 1.09[61,
5.11[2] (rev. ed. 1986).
"See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
18911 U.S.C. § 541(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986):
Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement of the case, only
legal title and not an equitable interest . . . becomes property of the estate ...
only to the extent of the debtor's legal title to such property, but not to the extent
of any equitable interest in such property that the debtor does not hold.
See id. at § 541(a)(1).
19 See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205 n.10 (1983).
Relevant legislative history may be found at S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 82, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWS 5787; H.R. REP. NO.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 368, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWS
5963.
' 91See, e.g., Mid-Atlantic Supply, Inc. v. Three Rivers Aluminum Co., 790
F.2d 1121, 1124 (4th Cir. 1986).
t92See, e.g., Georgia Pac. Corp. v. Sigma Service Corp., 712 F.2d 962, 966
n.I, 968 (5th Cir. 1983). See generally 2 S. SYMONS, POMEROY'S EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 375 (5th ed. 1941) (discussing the separation of legal and
equitable title).
193See, e.g., In re North American Coin & Currency, Ltd., 767 F.2d 1573,
1575 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Flight Transp. Corporate Sec. Litig., 730 F.2d 1128,
1136 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Auto-Train Corp., 53 Bankr. 990, 995-96 (D.D.C.
1985); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Brown, 40 Bankr. 214, 218 (W.D. Mo. 1984). See
generally 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, at 541.02[1], 541.13.
194In re Mahan & Rowsey, 817 F.2d 682, 684 (10th Cir. 1987).
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commingled bank accounts to a constructive trust and excluded them
from the debtor's estate to an extent defined by the LIBR.19 5
While nonproperty of the estate may be defined by restitutionary
tracing, the claimant must overcome many hurdles. The claimant must
show that the funds are impressed with equitable rights, and that the
funds existed in identifiable form among assets in the debtor's possession
at the time of bankruptcy.196 A contractual requirement to hold funds in
trust may not create a trust if the true relationship between the debtor and
creditor is merely contractual, and not one of trustee and beneficiary. The
debtor's rights to commingle and use funds infer a mere debtor-creditor
relationship. 19 7 Proof of these rights also jeopardizes the claimant's
recovery because restitutionary rights are concealed, giving the debtor
ostensible ownership of the funds. 19 8 A claimant must distinguish its
commingled funds from those of the debtor and other creditors, but the
cases often fail to indicate what form of tracing comports with federal
bankruptcy standards.t 99 Courts express concern over the difficulty and
administrative expense of tracing when multiple claimants are
involved. 2 00 A bankruptcy trustee can employ a hypothetical lien creditor
or other federal avoidance powers to defeat an otherwise sufficient tracing-
based claim that assets are not property of the estate. 20 1
1951d. at 683-84. Other cases support Mahan's broad holding that
commingled funds may be identified as not being the property of the estate by
means of tracing. See, e.g., Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 829 (1966); Yonkers Bd. of Educ. v. Richmond Children's
Center, Inc., 58 Bankr. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Martin Fein & Co., 43
Bankr. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also 124 CONG. REc. 32,417 (1978) (courts
should permit the use of reasonable assumptions under which taxing authorities
can identify withheld taxes).
1961n re Morales Travel Agency, 667 F.2d 1069, 1071 (1st Cir. 1981).1971d. See also In re Auto-Train Corp., 53 Bankr. 990, 997 n.21 (Bankr.
D.D.C. 1985).
198667 F.2d at 1073-74.
199See, e.g., In re Kennedy & Cohen, Inc., 612 F.2d 963, 966 (5th Cir. 1980)
(per curiam); Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749, 754 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 829 (1966). This may be because some claimants make no effort to trace. See
In re Esgro, Inc., 645 F.2d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Hurricane Elkhorne
Coal Corp. II, 19 Bankr. 609, 613 (Bankr. W.D.Ky. 1982). Federal
distributional policies may cause a court to scrutinize the state law grounds
allegedly supporting a constructive trust. See In re North American Coin &
Currency, 767 F.2d 1573, 1575 (9th Cir. 1986).
20 See, e.g., In re First Fidelity Financial Services, 36 Bankr. 508, 514 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1983).
201See In re General Coffee, 828 F.2d 699 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
__ U.S. - , 108 S. Ct. 1470 (1988). But see In re Quality Holstein Leasing,
752 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1985).
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A secured creditor employing restitutionary tracing to identify a
perfected security interest in commingled cash proceeds should be able to
overcome many of these obstacles if due regard is given to restitution's
supplemental role within Article Nine's framework.
20 2 This is suggested
in dictum, which states that caution must be exercised in imposing trusts
in favor of unsecured creditors because "it would be a simple matter for
one creditor, at the expenses of others, to circumvent the rules pertaining
to the creation of bona fide security interests."
20 3 A perfected secured
claim does not share the ostensible ownership concerns related to
restitutionary claims because a notice filing is present.
20 4 A secured
party's recovery from commingled funds identified by restitutionary
tracing should not conflict with federal distributional policies because
secured claims generally are recognized by the Bankruptcy Code.
20 5
Article Nine's priority rules would determine the secured party's priority
over the trustee and other claimants.
20 6 Nonetheless, a secured creditor
could face difficulties even if all these arguments are accepted. For
example, a bankruptcy court might hold that state law does not permit
secured creditors to identify proceeds by means of the LIBR.
20 7
In summary, neither section 9-306(4)(d) nor restitutionary tracing are
per se invalid in bankruptcy. However, secured claims employing either
state law entitlement face obstacles arising from the interaction with
federal bankruptcy law. A more precise comparison of their respective
avoidance risks is not possible. The risks will be assumed to be
approximately equal for purposes of the remaining discussion in this part.
C. The Risk of Conversion by Commingling
Nonpossessory security necessarily involves a risk that the debtor will
deal with collateral in an unauthorized manner that increases the riskiness
202See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
20 In re Morales Travel Agency, 667 F.2d 1069, 1072 (1st Cir. 1981). See also
id. at 1071 n.4 ("[Tlhe trust language may be viewed as an effort to create a
security interest . . . .Since [the creditor] ...has not asserted any claim to a
security interest, we need not consider whether [one was created].").
2 0
4See U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(b), (c) (1977).
20'See supra note 187.
206See generally supra note 85; notes 140-55 and accompanying text.
207Many jurisdictions have not ruled directly on the availability of
restitutionary principles to identify commingled cash proceeds. See supra note 43.
The probability of future negative holdings with respect to this issue is smaller
than that of affirmative rulings, but is not zero.
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of the secured loan. 20 8 A debtor has an incentive to engage in this conduct
because it enables the debtor to obtain a high-risk loan at a low-risk
cost. 20 9 Conversion by commingling results in collateral becoming
physically indistinguishable from noncollateral. 2 10 This conversion
increases the riskiness of the secured loan by interfering with the secured
party's ability to monitor or take possession of the collateral.
Commingling also may facilitate unauthorized transfers of collateral by
reducing the risk that the transferee can be defeated by the secured
party.211 Commingling cash proceeds is relatively inexpensive. 212 It
merely requires that the proceeds be deposited in a bank account
containing nonproceeds, or vice versa.
A secured party may monitor the debtor's behavior or take other steps
to reduce the risk of commingling. The amount of risk reduction obtained
depends upon circumstances such as the debtor's credit history, the agreed
interest rate, and the presence of other collateral, which is more difficult
to convert. 2 13 These factors affect the value of the commingling risk
perceived by the secured party. The amount of protection purchased is
also dependent upon cost. 21 4 The ease of commingling cash proceeds
suggests that the cost of protecting against this misbehavior is high.
Substantial risk protection results if the creditor intercepts all
proceeds before they reach the debtor. Account debtors are required to
make payments directly to a secured creditor under notification
208So does possessory security, but the risk is much smaller. For example, a
pledger might stealthily remove pledged securities from the pledgee's possession.
209SeeJackson & Kronman, supra note 159, at 1149. The common statement
that business reasons determine the extent to which secured parties protect
themselves against debtor misconduct is accurate, and results from Article Nine's
allocation of most conversion risks (e.g., failure to physically maintain or insure
collateral) to the secured party, and decision not to mandate monitoring of
collateral. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-205 comment 5 (1977); Business Frauds, Their
Perpetrations, Detection and Redress, 20 Bus. LAW. 83, 96 (1964).
21°See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
2 11See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
2 12Any collateral can be commingled if the debtor is willing to allocate
sufficient resources to the effort. Commingling an automobile is relatively costly
because it requires the removal of identification numbers and the disassembly of
the vehicle into constituent parts or subassemblies. The marketability of
encumbered goods may be enhanced by making them physically
indistinguishable from unencumbered goods. See generally Weinberg, Sales Law,
Economics, and the Negotiability of Goods, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 569, 571-74 (1980).
213See supra note 212.
214See Scott, supra note 160, at 924.
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financing. 2 15 However, notification financing is not universally elected
because it adds administrative costs. In addition, a creditor may have to
compensate the debtor for loss of goodwill resulting from the creditor's
intrusion into debtor-account debtor relationships.
2 1 6 Another strategy is
for the secured party to contractually bind the debtor to immediately
report the receipt of cash proceeds, which must then be deposited in a
special account accessible only by the secured party.217 The debtor also is
subject to unscheduled audits. Audits make commingling more costly by
increasing the risk that it will be detected and punished. However, a
window for the opportunistic debtor remains open during the period
between the debtor's receipt of cash proceeds and the probable time of the
secured creditor's discovery of a conversion. The incremental cost of
reducing this opening by more frequent audits may exceed the reduction
215See generally Reisman, What Commercial Lawyers Should Know About
Commercial Finance and Factoring, 79 COM. L.J. 146, 150-51 (1974). Initially,
account debtors may be given no notice of a financing relationship. The secured
party retains the option to notification finance, but receivables come directly to
the debtor absent some occurrence that decreases the creditor's comfort level,
such as the debtor's default in payments. See U.C.C. § 9-502(1); infra note 218
and accompanying text. See generally Colton, Legal Implications of Actions Taken by
Lenders Against Troubled Borrowers, 1981 J. COM. BANK LENDING 35, 40.
Notification financing does not eliminate the commingling risk. Some account
debtors may continue to make direct payments to the debtor after notification,
which suggests a need to monitor account debtors as well. Cf U.C.C. § 9-318.
2i 6Notification financing is not the only means by which to substantially
reduce the debtor's access to cash proceeds, although it may be the least costly.
An alternative is to have all the debtor's mail delivered by the post office to the
secured party. This requires a mechanism for the return to the debtor of mail
unrelated to the financing relationship. Another alternative is for the secured
party to employ a monitor to intercept cash proceeds upon arrival at the debtor's
premises and immediately deposit them into a special account accessible only to
the secured party. This arrangement, which leaves the secured party exposed to
the risk that the debtor may bribe the monitor, is reminiscent of inventory field
warehousing. See generally Skilton, Field Warehousing as a Financing Device: The
Warehouseman Goes to the Storer-Part 1, 1961 WIS. L. REV. 221. In general,
monitoring collateral is expensive. Monitors can command high salaries because
they have special skills and are expected to remain loyal in the face of temptation.
See generally Miller, Taking a Look at the Commercial Finance Contract, 65 A.B.A. J.
628 (1979).
2 17
A lender may require a "collateral reserve" or "blocked" account for the
deposit of all of the debtor's collections from the sale of inventory or the
liquidation of accounts receivable. The debtor is not permitted to make
withdrawals from the account without the creditor's permission. The debtor may
or may not have access to the collections prior to deposit, depending on the
conversion risk perceived by the secured party. See generally 1 BENDER'S
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE §§ 4.02[5][d]; 4.08 (1988).
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in conversion risk purchased. A secured party rationally may dispense
with audits entirely or make them infrequent, relying instead on the
debtor's contractual covenants to report proceeds and use a special
account. Given a small enough conversion risk, the secured party may
require the debtor to periodically report and pay proceeds without the use
of a special account. This may amount to nothing more than monitoring
the timeliness of scheduled loan repayments.
The quantity of risk reduction purchased by the secured creditor may
vary during the financing relationship according to changes in the
creditor's perception of the commingling risk. 2 18 The risk is aggravated
when a debtor is under financial stress and is motivated to take risks
beyond those contemplated at the inception of the financing
relationship. 219 In this context, a secured creditor might invoke a
previously unused audit right or demand strict compliance with reporting
or special account covenants.
D. The Mouse, Restitution, and Optimality
If the reduction of aggregate credit costs is an important goal of
personal property security law, does section 9-306(4)(d) or restitutionary
tracing more closely approach optimality? The former entitlement saves
administrative costs when compared to the latter.220 Under the mouse, it
is necessary to decide only whether there were receipts during the ten day
period, whether they consisted of proceeds, and whether the account was
commingled. 2 21 Under restitutionary tracing, the period of account
activity defining the secured party's entitlement commences with the
debtor's first wrongful act of commingling that is not followed by a lowest
intermediate balance of zero. 22 2 Wrongful acts may occur repeatedly and
at any time before an event such as bankruptcy prevents further
commingling. For example, consider a debtor with an active general
account who occasionally converts proceeds for several months and then
218Changing market conditions or loss experience may cause a secured party
to adjust the amount of risk reduction purchased. See Biborosch, Floor Plan
Financing, 77 BANKING L.J. 725, 725-26, 737 (1960).
219 See Scott, supra note 160, at 924.
220Administrative efficiency may be relevant to the choice of entitlements.
See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093-94 (1972).
221See supra text accompanying notes 23-38.
222See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
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begins wholesale commingling a few weeks before bankruptcy. The
amount of proceeds and nonproceeds in the account fluctuate as funds are
deposited and withdrawn. Disputes will arise concerning whether a
particular deposit consisted of proceeds, and whether the deposit was
wrongful. Another issue is the size of the lowest intermediate balance.
223
The relationship between the two entitlements and monitoring also
may impact the aggregate cost of secured financing. Each entitlement
provides a free substitute for the costly monitoring, which may affect a
secured creditor's conduct. 224 A secured creditor will monitor less if the
entitlement is a close substitute for monitoring and more if the
entitlement is a weak substitute. Is there a significant difference between
the quality of the monitoring substitutes provided by section 9-306(4)(d)
and restitutionary tracing?
Section 9-306(4)(d) cuts off a secured party's claim to untransferred
commingled cash proceeds received prior to ten days before
bankruptcy. 225 Therefore, assuming commingling, a secured party has
ten days to obtain payment on account of the proceeds or begin a
bankruptcy proceeding. 2 26 Under restitution's LIBR, cash proceeds float
on top of nonproceeds and remain undiminished until all the nonproceeds
are withdrawn from the account. 227 Proceeds might stay afloat for more
than ten days and remain identifiable to a security interest. It may follow
that a secured creditor will start monitoring sooner and monitor more
frequently under the mouse than under the LIBR, making the mouse a
weaker substitute for monitoring. Nonetheless, any difference in the
quality of the two substitutes is not so obvious.
Initially, a secured financer may broadly focus monitoring on the
debtor's operational decisions and general business welfare rather than
tightly focusing on cash proceeds. 228 The focus may shift towards tighter
223It may be uncertain whether the debtor's conduct was authorized by the
secured party. See supra notes 45-46. Section 9-306(4) and identification by
restitutionary tracing present other administrative complications. For example,
under the former it may be necessary to deduct payments to the secured party on
account of cash proceeds received by the debtor during the mouse's ten day
period. See supra note 22. Under restitutionary tracing, it may be necessary to
decide whether the debtor's funds were deposited with an intent to make
restitution. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
224 See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text. The entitlement is free in
the sense that it is automatically obtained by operation of law, but only after
resources have been expendedin entering into a secured financing relationship.
225U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d) (1977). See supra text accompanying notes 92-114.
226See U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(ii).
2 2 7See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
228See Scott, supra note 160, at 950-51.
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monitoring if the financer suspects that the debtor is in financial straits or
is behaving opportunistically. Cash proceeds cannot be tightly monitored,
however, without determining whether each of the debtor's cash receipts
consists of proceeds or nonproceeds.2 2 9 The debtor's possession and
disposition of cash proceeds cannot be monitored without either
segregating them before they are commingled, or by tracing. 230
Therefore, a secured party wishing to monitor more tightly may take
steps to capture proceeds before they are commingled, or may monitor
cash flow, but is unlikely to monitor the flow of cash proceeds through the
debtor's enterprise.2 3 1 A secured party is unlikely to calculate the value of
the entitlements because of the probable rapid obsolescence of the
information and because of the desire for more security than the
entitlements are likely to provide. 23 2 Therefore, both section 9-306(4)(d)
and restitutionary tracing are weak substitutes for monitoring and in this
respect there is little basis for concluding that one is superior to the other.
An analysis of the optimality of Article Nine's entitlements to
commingled funds is incomplete if it is limited to section 9-306(4)(d) and
restitutionary entitlements. These are the two components of an
asymmetric entitlement scheme dependent upon the institution of
insolvency proceedings. It has been suggested that this asymmetry may
create an incentive for an unsecured creditor to force the debtor into
bankruptcy if the creditor believes that the debtor's secured creditor will
get less under the mouse than through restitutionary tracing. 23 3 A
secured creditor would have the same incentive if it believed that the
mouse would benefit its interests. A bankruptcy initiated because of such
229The financer would be required to monitor receipts even if it had the
option of insisting upon notification financing. See supra text accompanying note
215. This option could not be implemented instantaneously, and might be
appropriate only for account debtors with substantial or extended dealings with
the debtor.
230A secured creditor is not likely to make its monitoring dependent upon
tracing. See infra notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
231See Kripke, supra note 168, at 950, 968.
232Several pieces of rapidly changing data may be required. See supra notes
181-82 and accompanying text.
2 33 T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 85-86 n.36
(1986).
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incentives may not be in the collective best interests of all the debtor's
creditors.
234
This concern presupposes that the entitlements are biased or can be
successfully manipulated. There is no bias. 2 35 Manipulation assumes that
a class of creditors enjoy a comparative advantage in knowing the timing
and contents of the debtor's deposits and withdrawals. This information is
costly to obtain, quickly becomes obsolete, and is not essential to a
concerned secured creditor's two most likely courses of action: monitoring
cash flow and segregating receipts to prevent commingling. 236 A bank-
creditor might enjoy some advantage in obtaining and utilizing this
information if it is also the depository institution holding the commingled
account. 23 7 However, such a bank is likely to have a right to set off the
secured debt against the account, which is independent of any rights it
may have in cash proceeds qua secured party.238 If this right exists, the
bank can make a set-off, and may be indifferent to any advantage that the
mouse offers over identification by restitutionary tracing.
239
V. CONCLUSION: TIME FOR THE "MURD'RING PATTLE"?
Section 9-306(4)(d) defines a secured party's entitlement to
commingled funds in a bankrupt debtor's estate. Restitutionary tracing,
including the LIBR, identifies the entitlement to cash proceeds in the
debtor's possession absent bankruptcy, and the entitlement to transferred
234See generally id. at 33.
235See supra text accompanying notes 180-82.
236See supra text accompanying notes 224-27.
237See Rauer, supra note 149, at 248-50.
23 8The right to a set-off is excluded from the scope of Article Nine. See
U.C.C. §§ 9-104(i), 9-306(4)(d)(1). A security interest covering the proceeds in
an account may have priority over the set-off. See, e.g., Citizen's Nat'l Bank v.
Mid-States Dev. Co., 380 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. App. 1978). A bank may not be
permitted to set off against a bank account if it failed to file a financing statement
against the original collateral from which the funds in the account were derived.
See Craig v. Gudim, 488 P.2d 316 (Wyo. 1971). Banks' set-off rights are
preserved in bankruptcy, subject to certain limitations. See 11 U.S.C. § 553
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). For example, deposits subjected to a set-off must not
have been accepted for that purpose. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 553(a)(3)(C) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986). See generally 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, at 553.14-.17.
239The bank's set-off rights are not limited by U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)'s ten
day rule. See U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(i), (ii). The existence of a right to set-off is
determined by rules external to Article Nine. See Clark, Bank Exercise of Set-Off"
Avoiding the Pitfalls, 98 BANKING L.J. 221-22 (1981).
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cash proceeds. In its general suppletive role under Article Nine,
restitution is also a source of judicial remedies in cases of unauthorized
commingling. An entitlement to commingled cash proceeds can lower the
aggregate cost of secured credit. The mouse involves lower administrative
costs than restitutionary tracing. In addition, there is no disadvantage
associated with the mouse in terms of its avoidability in bankruptcy or as a
substitute for monitoring. Neither entitlement is biased in favor of
secured or unsecured creditors, and perverse incentives caused by Article
Nine's asymmetric entitlement scheme seem unlikely.
Criticisms of section 9-306(4)(d) and Article Nine's entitlement
scheme ultimately may reflect a concern that they are just too complex. A
simpler approach might employ the same entitlement in all cases. For
example, a secured party's entitlement could always turn on its ability to
identify proceeds by means of restitutionary tracing. 240 This approach
avoids the need for a special bankruptcy entitlement. However, any gain
in simplicity may be illusory because of the LIBR's complexity.24 1
Complete symmetry also is obtainable by modifying section 9-
306(4)(d) to define the secured party's entitlement in all cases without
regard to whether the commingled cash proceeds are subject to
bankruptcy administration or were transferred by the debtor. For
example, the secured party might be absolutely barred from recovering on
account of cash proceeds ten days after they are received by the debtor
unless they are never commingled. 24 2 The wisdom of such a rule in the
case of transferred cash proceeds is debatable, however, because its only
effect is to prevent recovery from non good faith purchasers. 243
Improved symmetry might be obtained if a modified mouse applied
both in and out of bankruptcy in cases of untransferred cash proceeds,
leaving transferred cash proceeds to identification by restitutionary
tracing. 244 The modified mouse would require a day-counting formula
that is clear and reaches desirable results. Current section 9-306(4)(d)
limits the secured creditor to the amount of any cash proceeds received by
the debtor within ten days before the institution of insolvency
240See Gillombardo, supra note 185, at 30-31. Not all states have held that
identification by restitutionary tracing is available under Article Nine. See supra
note 207.
241See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
242The secured party would have ten days from receipt to formally assert its
claim to cash proceeds that are commingled after receipt. See supra note 75.
243See supra notes 92-94, 98-105 and accompanying text.
244Cf E. FARNSWORTH & J. HONNOLD, supra note 40, at 933.
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proceedings. 245 The formula works because bankruptcy commences with
a filing, which generally freezes the actions of creditors.
24 6 It is possible to
conceive the outline of a modified mouse employing a day-counting
formula similar to current section 9-306(4)(d)'s, but which operates in
noninsolvency settings. 2 47 However, fleshing out the details and enacting
the product may not be worth the effort. The entitlement would be at least
as complex as the mouse. 2 48 In addition, it would be infrequently
invoked, except when bankruptcy interferes with the secured party's self-
help.
24 9
One could easily improve upon section 9-306(4)(d)'s complexity. For
example, a secured party might be entitled to a statutory percentage of all
24 5U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d).
246See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
247Under a modified mouse applicable in and out of insolvency proceedings,
a secured creditor might receive the amount of cash proceeds received within ten
days before "any person becomes a lien creditor." Cf U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b),
(3). Non-U.C.C. law would control the grounds for legal process, whether and
when a lien is obtained, and so forth. These rules are not uniform, and may not
be conducive to a bright line entitlement. See DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra
note 107, at 6.04-.05. Aside from these possible objections, the entitlement
might work if the lien is obtained by an unsecured creditor. The unsecured
creditor would recover all the funds in the commingled account (up to to the
amount of its judgment) minus the secured party's entitlement. The secured
party would have no entitlement to proceeds received after the ten days, absent a
second lien. The first lien presumably would be a default permitting the secured
party to collect cash proceeds directly from account debtors or take other steps to
avoid future commingling. See supra text accompanying notes 218-19.
Although workable, this entitlement might be insignificant in cases of
competing secured claims. Suppose that SPI's perfected security interest extends
to a commingled bank account because it covers inventory and proceeds. So does
SP2's, which is subordinate to SPI as the second filed under Article Nine's
priority rules. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5). SP2 obtains a lien against the account on
June 1, which "anchors" the end of SPI's ten day entitlement. See supra notes
123-24 and accompanying text. But what if SPI then obtains a lien on June 6?
This creates intersecting entitlements. SPI's priority should give it first claim to
the amount of proceeds during the period of intersection. However, neither
secured party is likely to go to the trouble of obtaining a lien under these
circumstances. A more likely scenario is a declaration of the debtor's default
followed by immediate efforts to collect cash proceeds from account debtors or
other steps to monitor and avoid further commingling. See supra text
accompanying notes 215-19. Such tactics will generally be faster and more
effective than judicial relief because of a lack of information concerning the
commingled account's contents and because summary relief is not instantaneous,
if it is available at all. See supra text accompanying notes 125-26.
248See supra note 247.
249Id.
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of the bankruptcy estate's commingled cash and bank accounts. 250 Any
percentage rule would be easier to administer than the mouse. However,
one may doubt the palatability of an entitlement lacking some justifying
assumption (e.g., proceeds float on nonproceeds; most of the debtor's
receipts during its final days are proceeds; and so on).2 51 Caution also
must be exercised, lest one adopt an entitlement that too greatly
discourages monitoring by secured parties. 25 2 In the end, it may be best
to leave the malformed mouse alone.
25°There are other possibilities. For example, the financer might be required
to share commingled proceeds pro rata with other perfected secured creditors. Cf
U.C.C. § 9-315 (1977). This approach would cost the financer its priority over
other perfected security interests in cases involving commingled cash proceeds,
but would preserve its priority over unperfected security interests and unsecured
creditors. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b).
251See supra text accompanying notes 6-7, 43.
252See supra text accompanying notes 165, 168-73.
